Report: Zhao Xing and China’s diplomatic priorities in Afghanistan.

Has Zhao been sent to Afghanistan to help the Taliban join the international community?

On 8 Sept, Zhao Xing (赵星) arrived in Kabul to take up his post as China’s newest Ambassador to Afghanistan. When, on 13 Sept, Zhao presented his credentials to Mohammad Hassan Akhund, Acting Prime Minister of the Afghan Interim Government, China became the first country to post a new ambassador-level diplomat to Afghanistan since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021¹.

Whilst the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that Zhao’s appointment was part of a normal rotation of ambassadorial appointments, a Reuters article pointed out that the decision to present credentials sets China apart. This is because other countries have opted to use of the title ‘charge d'affaires’, which does not require the formal presentation of credentials².

This has led many to speculate that official recognition from China might be imminent, which would make China the first country to officially recognise the Taliban-led government. The Taliban has struggled to gain international recognition, mostly due to the group’s extremist views, association with terrorist groups, and poor human rights record.

Before discussing Zhao’s selection in more detail, it is important to first consider the current state of China – Afghanistan relations.

After the Taliban’s return to power, China was quick to indicate a willingness to continue engagement with the country, particularly on issues such as security and trade. According to a SIPRI report published in November 2022, China’s biggest priority in Afghanistan is security, namely, the safety of Chinese citizens, the protection of investments, as well as the suppression of extremist groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which uses Afghanistan as a safe haven³. Without the Taliban’s cooperation, it will be difficult for China to address any of these issues.

China has also signalled a desire to strengthen economic ties with Afghanistan. Following the 5th China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Dialogue, held in May 2023, a joint statement was published that reaffirmed “trilateral cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and to jointly extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor [CPEC] to Afghanistan”⁴. The potential extension of CPEC into Afghanistan has been an on-going discussion since at least 2017⁵, however progress has been slow.

Afghanistan’s natural resources have long attracted the attention of Chinese investors. The most significant development since the Taliban’s return happened in early 2023, when the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC) reached an agreement that Aljazeera called “the first major public commodities extraction deal the Taliban administration has signed with a foreign company since taking power in 2021”. The deal will involve the investment worth hundreds of millions of dollars into Afghanistan⁶.

Zabihullah Mujahid, a spokesman for the Taliban-led government, stated during an interview in 2022 that “[t]he Taliban wants China’s help. Their investments are important for [the Taliban] too. Afghanistan is a very good market. China can use its influence at the United Nations to help Afghanistan and its investors to solve their problems”⁷. It appears as if China was listening, because at a Security Council meeting less than 6 months later, China called for the lifting of sanctions on Afghanistan and the return of the Afghan Central Bank’s assets held overseas⁸. The Taliban is clearly optimistic that relations with China will help it gain a footing in the international community.

It is within this context that Zhao Xing begins his term as China’s Ambassador to Afghanistan. Whilst a detailed CV of Zhao’s diplomatic career is not available, China Diplomatic Digest was able to approximate Zhao’s background using online sources.

For the past 10 years, Zhao has spent the majority of his time at the MFA’s Department of International Organizations and Conferences. According to the MFA’s website, the Department

“[s]tudies the developments and trends in multilateral diplomacy, deals with multilateral diplomatic affairs in political, human rights, social, refugee and other fields and gives guidance to China's overseas diplomatic missions on the relevant work”⁹. 

During his time in the department, Zhao has dealt with diplomatic issues relating to global covid vaccine distribution¹⁰, development funding¹¹, and migration¹². In late 2022, Zhao also gave a speech about multilateralism with Chinese characteristics¹³.

Since arriving in Afghanistan, Zhao has already met with senior Taliban leader and Acting Minister of Interior, Sirajuddin Haqqani¹⁴, as well as the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan, Roza Otunbayeva¹⁵.

It is therefore fair to infer that Zhao is in Afghanistan to assist the Taliban with issues relating to international engagement. Whilst the specifics of Zhao’s priorities are yet to be revealed, it is likely that he will play an important role moving forward. The Taliban will, no doubt, appreciate having an expert in multilateralism as China’s envoy.

Zhao Xing CV

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2013 - ?  Director, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, MFA¹⁶

2016 – 2018¹⁷ ¹⁸ Counselor, Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other international organizations

2019¹⁹ Counselor, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, MFA

2020²⁰ Second-class Inspector, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, MFA

2021 - 2023²¹ ²² Deputy Director-General, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, MFA

2023²³ – Present Ambassador to Afghanistan

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References

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7.  youtube.com/watch?v=Ssc5PUm8a-Q&t=1093s

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