Diplomats race to congratulate Maldivian President-elect

What will Muizzu's victory mean for the rivalry between India and China?

Oct 14, 2023

On 30 Sept, Dr. Mohamed Muizzu claimed victory in the Maldivian 2023 presidential election, defeating incumbent President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. Foreign dignitaries resident in the Maldives quickly raced to congratulate him, including the Chinese and Indian Ambassadors.

The first to arrive on 4 Oct was the UK’s High Commissioner1, next was the Chinese Ambassador2, the Indian High Commissioner3, and the UAE Ambassador4.

In the week that followed, Muizzu met with country representatives from Bangladesh, Japan, Pakistan5, Saudi Arabia6, Sri Lanka7, Australia8, and finally, the US on 12 Oct9. Within two weeks of the election, every diplomat currently residing in the Maldives personally congratulated the President-elect. The rate of which these meetings took place appears to be unprecedented.

For some of these diplomats, this was not their first encounter with Muizzu. This is because prior to his election as President, Muizzu had been serving as the Mayor of Malé, the country’s capital, where he would occasionally meet with the diplomats residing in the city. For example, Chinese Ambassador Wang Lixin met with him on at least four separate occasions 10 11 12 13.

Increased diplomatic presence in the Maldives

This is, without a doubt, the most diplomatic jostling a Maldivian President-elect has experienced following an election.

Despite being an island nation with a population of approximately five-hundred thousand, the Maldives has found itself in the middle of a geopolitical rivalry between China and India. This is due to the country’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean, most critically, because of its proximity to several major shipping lanes14.

Historically, the Maldives has fallen within India’s sphere of influence, with the two countries enjoying close relations for many years. Indeed, prior to China opening its embassy in 2011, the only countries with representation in the Maldives were those from the surrounding region, namely, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.

Since 2011, Saudi Arabia (2015), Japan (2016), the UAE (2019), the UK (2019), Australia (2023), and the US (2023) all opened embassies. Most notably, every member of the so-called ‘Quad’ now has a representative in the Maldives.

The Quad, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, is an informal security dialogue between India, Japan, Australia, and the US that was re-formed in 2017 for the purpose of maintaining a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, however most see it as a response to China’s growing influence in the region.

This year’s election drew a lot of international attention because, from a foreign policy perspective, it was seen as a race between a “pro-India” and a “pro-China” candidate.

The pro-India candidate was President Solih, who would have been Quad’s preferred winner. This is because of his “India First” foreign policy that prioritised relations with India, and his government’s proactive engagement with Quad members on maritime security initiatives.

Muizzu was seen as the “pro-China” candidate because of his role in helping facilitate large Chinese infrastructure projects during his time as Minister of Housing and Infrastructure under President Yameen (2013 – 2018). He has also kept up his China-friendly rhetoric since then.

So whilst countries such as India, Japan, Australia, the US, as well as the UK, were likely disappointed that President Solih did not secure a second term, their representatives in the Maldives would have still wanted to seek out Muizzu to advocate for a continuance of Solih-era foreign policies.

What does a Muizzu presidency mean for China?

The consensus is that Muizzu’s election will be a setback for India and a win for China. Whilst insisting that he is pro-Maldives - not anti-India, nor pro-China15 - Muizzu has indicated that the return of the Progressive Party of Maldives to government would “script a further chapter of strong ties between [the] two countries, both domestically and internationally”16.

It is, therefore, likely that Muizzu will choose to ratify the China-Maldives Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that was signed in late 2017 but never implemented. The Solih administration, after coming into power in 2018, refused to change the necessary laws because of the unbalanced nature of such an agreement17. Ambassador Wang Lixin has not forgotten about the FTA, however, and has publicly advocated for it on multiple occasions 18 19 20 21.

Mimrah Abdul Ghafoor, writing for the Observer Research Foundation, suggests that whilst it may seem puzzling as to why China would want an FTA with such a small economy, the reason China wants the deal is because it would increase its commercial influence over the Maldives22.

During his campaign, Muizzu also promised to remove all foreign military personnel from the Maldives23. Such a move would greatly benefit China, as it would reduce the presence of potentially unfriendly naval forces in the region. This is because, if a conflict were to breakout, a blockade in the region would cut China off from energy imports from the Gulf.

Solih’s administration had been increasing the country’s engagement with Quad countries on maritime security, including signing a framework for a defense and security relationship with the US in 202024, and a deal with India “to develop, support and maintain a Maldives National Defence Force Coast Guard Harbour” in 202125. Muizzu’s rise to power could see the Maldives reducing its cooperation with the US and India on these issues.

In short, Muizzu’s victory will likely mean strengthened ties with China, FTA ratification, and a scale back of maritime security cooperation with Quad countries. All of which are wins for China.

The existing relationship between Muizzu and Wang will no doubt make it easier for China moving forward. Wang is a seasoned diplomat with previous postings to India, Singapore, and Nepal. She has also held senior roles in the Department of Asian Affairs and Department of External Security Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs26. Wang’s past experience will help her advocate for Chinese interests whilst at the same time navigating the complexities of Maldivian politics.

Muizzu has also previously spoken highly of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and suggested that it has been a net benefit for the country27. Therefore, it is also likely that more BRI projects will be announced in the near future, which Wang suggested would likely be “in the fields of health, environmental protection, blue economy as well as agriculture and fishery”28.

In a further sign of Muizzu’s close friendship with China, on 9 Oct he was invited to attend a reception hosted by the Chinese embassy celebrating the 74^th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Interestingly, current President Solih was not present. During Muizzu’s remarks, he reiterated his wish for further development of China-Maldives relations29.

Whilst early indications show that Muizzu is also seeking to have a positive relationship with India and will likely make his first overseas trip there30, it is expected that following his inauguration, Muizzu’s government will seek to bring China-Maldives relations to heights not seen since President Yameen’s years in office.