In review: Chinese diplomatic appointments in 2023
In 2023, China appointed forty-six new ambassadors, including three vice-ministerial-level ambassadors to the US, Japan, and North Korea, as well as two new ambassadors to China’s UN Missions in Geneva and Vienna. Whilst not officially an ambassador, a new Head of Office was also appointed to China’s Office to Palestine. The last ambassador to take up their post in 2023 was the new Chinese Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea, Wang Wengang, who just arrived on 31 December.
Before shifting our attention to 2024, let us take a moment to review some of the most important changes China made to its diplomatic network over the past 12 months. Whilst many of the appointments made during the year were noteworthy, here are five of the most significant changes made (presented in no particular order):
1. Xie Feng, China’s new Ambassador to the US
One of the most significant changes China made in 2023 was the appointment of Vice Minister Xie Feng (谢锋) to the role of Chinese Ambassador to the US. Whilst Xie did not take up his new post until mid-May, his possible selection was leaked to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in January. It is also his third time being posted to the Chinese Embassy in the US.
The WSJ wrote that Xie “is regarded by both colleagues and foreign counterparts as a firm and evenhanded conduit” between the two countries, and suggested that he was appointed “to dial back [China’s] aggressive diplomacy” in an attempt to help improve the country’s image.
Unlike his predecessor, Qin Gang, Xie is a US expert, having spent most of his career focusing on North American affairs. During his time as Vice Foreign Minister, Xie was in charge of US-China relations.
When Xie took his new office, China’s relationship with the US was at its lowest point in decades. Since his appointment, however, relations between the two countries have gradually improved. For example, in November 2023 President Xi Jinping made his first visit to the US in six years to attend the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in San Fransisco, where he met with US President Joe Biden. Just before the summit, China and the US had also held arms-control talks for the first time in years.
2. Yu Bo, China’s first-ever Ambassador to Honduras
2023 also saw the appointment of China’s first-ever Ambassador to Honduras, Yu Bo (于波). Originally, Yu had been leading the team sent to set up China’s new embassy, following the establishment of ties between China and Honduras in March 2023. Yu had experience in such matters, having just performed a similar task next door in Nicaragua.
Yu’s position as chargé d'affaires in Honduras was made permanent when he was selected to be the new ambassador. The only two Central American countries still retaining relations with the Republic of China (aka, Taiwan) are Honduras’s neighbours, Belize, and Guatemala. You can find more information about Yu Bo here.
3. Zhao Xing, the first ambassador to present credentials to the Taliban
When it was announced that Zhao Xing (赵星) had arrived in Afghanistan and had presented his credentials to the Taliban-led government, global media quickly picked up the story. This is because Zhao was the first diplomat to officially present ambassadorial credentials to the Afghan government since the Taliban’s takeover in 2021. This drew a lot of interest because other countries have been opting to use the title ‘chargé d'affaires’ to avoid legitimating the Taliban by having their diplomats present official letters of credence to Taliban leaders.
Whilst the Chinese government still does not officially recognise the Taliban-led government, China is also the first country to accept an ambassador sent by the new government. For more information about Zhao Xing’s appointment, including his background, see this article.
4. Wu Wei, China’s new Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)
Perhaps the most drama-filled appointment of the year was that of Wu Wei (吴伟), former Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department of External Security Affairs, who was posted to the Federated States of Micronesia. The reason for describing this appointment as dramatic is that Wu Wei’s appointment had been originally rejected due to national security concerns by then-President David Panuelo, who had been openly critical of China’s politicking in the region.
In an interview with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Panuelo recalled:
“I received his curriculum vitae in probably December of 2022, and I was worried that the Department of External Security Affairs is one of China’s Foreign Affairs entities with strong relationships with China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) — that’s their CIA equivalent — and their Ministry of Public Security (MPS) — which is their FBI equivalent. All three work on United Front Work issues, such as secret police stations in Canada, New York, London, and Tokyo.”
According to a letter penned by Panuelo whilst he was still President, the Chinese government did not respond directly to the rejection of Wu Wei. Rather, they signalled to other FSM politicians that China would simply wait for Panuelo’s successor to take office. Soon after Wesley Simina succeeded Panuelo as President of FSM, Wu’s appointment was approved and he arrived to take up his post in June.
5. Wang Yajun, China’s Ambassador to North Korea
In March 2023, Wang Yajun (王亚军) finally took office as the new Chinese Ambassador to North Korea. Whilst Wang’s selection had been made public in early 2021, he had to wait nearly two years to take up his post, as it wasn’t until 2023 that North Korea made a one-off exception to its COVID policy to allow Wang into the country. By that time, Wang’s predecessor, Li Jinjun, had long since departed Pyongyang, having left in December 2021. This meant that China did not have an ambassador resident in Pyongyang for more than a year.
Prior to Wang’s posting to North Korea, he had been serving as a Vice Minister of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CCP. Unlike other diplomatic relationships, the International Liaison Department plays an important role managing China’s relationship with North Korea. As one of the youngest vice-ministerial-level officials within China’s foreign affairs apparatus, Wang’s future career will be one to watch.
These are but a few examples of the important changes China made to its diplomatic network in 2023.
Analysis of the 2023 cohort also shows that only seven (15.2 per cent) of the ambassadors appointed were women, none of which were vice-ministerial-level appointments. This figure is in-line with the broader situation in Chinese politics. A 2023 UN report expressed concern when it found that women only constituted “35 per cent of diplomats (2023), 11.3 per cent of ambassadors (2022), 32.7 per cent of judges (2017) and 22.3 per cent of members of management teams in public institutions (2017)”.
Writing for MERICS in 2018, Sabine Mokry found that most Chinese ambassadorial posts lasted on average for three and a half years, and that China swaps up to a third of its ambassadors each year. As such, we should expect to see a similar number of ambassadors appointed in 2024 as there were appointed in 2023. This also means that many current Chinese ambassadors will be concluding their posts this year.
At the end of 2023, fifteen ambassadorial posts were still vacant, namely: Albania, Angola, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Eritrea, India, Laos, Madagascar, Qatar, Singapore, Samoa, Syria, Sudan, Tonga, and Yemen.
The first ambassadorial post to be filled in 2024 was Samoa, with Fei Mingxing arriving in Apia to take up his new role on 1 Jan. Whilst most of the remaining posts will be filled this year, it is possible that some may not. For example, China has still not replaced its Ambassador to India, despite the position being made vacant in Oct 2022.
As we head into 2024, it will be important to continue monitoring Chinese diplomatic appointments, as they provide an insight into China’s overarching foreign policy priorities. It will be interesting to see which appointments are made, and the impact each one will have. Make sure to stay subscribed to China Diplomatic Digest to keep up to date with the latest analysis.
EDIT 04/01/2024: Two vacant ambassadorial posts (Yemen and Libya) were accidentally excluded from in the original article, both have since been added.