China’s New Ambassador to Madagascar
Who is Ambassador Ji Ping?
Summary:
Ji Ping (季平) is China’s new Ambassador to Madagascar
Previously, Ji was the Chinese Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina
Madagascar has been part of the Belt and Road Initiative since 2017
China is a major customer of Malagasy graphite
Most of China’s infrastructure projects in Madagascar have been road developments
Malagasy debt to China is increasing steadily but remains relatively low
China is interested in cooperating with Madagascar on more road development and energy projects
Ji Ping has experience promoting these types of projects from his time in Bosnia and Herzegovina
On 12 March, Ji Ping arrived in Madagascar to take up his new role as ambassador. Prior to his appointment, Ji had been serving as Chinese Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Ji is not your typical career diplomat, as he has spent half of his career working in the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee. From 2011 to 2016, he also served as the Deputy Secretary-General of the China Peace and Development Foundation, a charitable organisation that is overseen by the Party.
For more information on Ji Ping’s career, see the end of this article.
Ji’s arrival in Madagascar has come at a time of increased China-Madagascar cooperation. The number of Chinese infrastructure projects in Madagascar is growing and China is making efforts to stimulate bilateral trade, with 98% of Malagasy exports to China now tariff free as of December 2023.
China-Madagascar trade
Trade volume: ~ $2.1 billion (2022)
Exports (to China): $625 million (2022)
Main products exported to China: Raw Nickel, Thorium, Graphite, Zirconium, Cobalt, Crude Mica
Imports (from China): $1.45 billion (2022)
Source: UN Comtrade1
Despite dominating the global supply of graphite, China has been steadily increasing its graphite imports, and Madagascar is a major supplier. Since 2017, import volume of Malagasy graphite has increased from 3.01 kilotonnes in 2017 to 51.16 kilotonnes in 2022. The only country exporting more graphite to China is Mozambique.
Early in 2024, a deal was struck between graphite producer Etablissements Gallois S.A. and Shandong Hi-Speed Road & Bridge Co Ltd for a broad scope agreement relating to graphite mining projects. Malagasy graphite is evidently becoming more important to China.
As stated above, the number of infrastructure projects in Madagascar involving Chinese companies is also increasing. For example, in April 2023, it was announced that China Eximbank would provide a $240 million preferential loan for the long-planned Ranomafana hydroelectric power plant, with Sinohydro set to carry out the construction.
Ji's predecessor Guo Xiaomei described it as ‘the largest financing cooperation project between China and Madagascar since the establishment of diplomatic relations’.
Despite joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in March 2017, big ticket Chinese infrastructure projects in Madagascar have been slow to progress. For example, in 2017, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) signed a deal to build a port in Madagascar’s Narinda bay, however little has been heard of the project since.
For a short while, a Chinese company was also expecting to redevelop Madagascar’s main port in Toamasina. The original contract had been agreed in 2015, with the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) reportedly signing a $1.2 billion deal for the expansion. However, it was revealed in March 2017 that Madagascar had gone for a cheaper option using a loan from Japan (and using Japanese companies for construction).
Aside from China’s involvement in Madagascar’s on-going efforts to modernise its telecommunications network, most new projects have focused on developing Madagascar’s road network, which is something that China has been doing long before Madagascar joined the BRI.
Recent examples of Chinese roads include the Ivato-Tsarasaotra Road to Ivato International Airport, the expressway linking Ivato International Airport and the Boulevard de l'Europe, the 151.7 km rehabilitation project of the RN5A, and the Tamatave Port Expressway
The lack of any large flagship projects has led analysts such as Veronika Blablová, writing for the China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe, to comment that Madagascar ‘seems to be immune to Chinese proposals for huge infrastructural projects’.
Madagascar may have rejected some of China’s proposals, however, Malagasy debt to China is still on track to exceed $500 million within the next few years. That being said, at least for now, the proportion of Chinese debt remains relatively low. Nevertheless, the recent upward spike will have some concerned that China’s influence there is growing.
China also wants to expand its involvement in Madagascar’s energy transition, which is a priority for the developing nation.
For example, it is possible a Chinese company could win the proposed 200MW Ihazolava solar PV power project, which Madagascar opened up for tender in 2023. As of writing this article, it is not yet clear which company won the contract.
At a recent meeting with Malagasy President Andry Rajoelina, Ji mentioned both hydropower and solar as examples of the types of projects China is interested in supporting. At this meeting, Chinese media reported that Rajoelina also referred to China as Madagascar’s ‘priority partner’.
During Ji Ping’s time in Bosnia and Herzegovina, China increased its involvement in the country’s energy sector, with deals being reached relating to hydropower, solar, and wind projects. Contracts for several road development projects were also won by Chinese companies, including the 33 km Vukosavlje-Brcko section and the 17 km Brcko-Bijeljina section of a highway planned in northern Bosnia.
Ji therefore does have experience advocating for the sorts of projects that China is interested in promoting in Madagascar.
Based on Ji Ping’s track record, China will likely continue making steady progress. That being said, there are a number of factors that may hinder China’s efforts, such as competing tender bids from other countries or even opposition from the local Malagasy population. Ji’s performance, therefore, will depend on more than just his past experience.
Ji recently stated that, as part of his effort to further promote China-Madagascar cooperation, he will be meeting with people from a variety of different Malagasy government departments to get their input. It is therefore possible we could see an expansion of Chinese involvement into other sectors in Madagascar in the future.
Ji Ping’s CV
1990 - 2006: Deputy Director, Director, Assistant Director and Deputy Director, Bureau No. 1 (Asia), International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
2006 - 2007: Assistant to the Mayor of Weifang City, Shandong Province
2009 - 2011: Counselor, Chinese Embassy, India
2011 - 2016: Deputy Secretary-General, China Peace and Development Foundation
2016 - 2018: Deputy Director and Director of the Protocol Bureau of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee
2019 - 2024: Chinese Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina
2024 - Present: Chinese Ambassador to Madagascar
Education
Peking University (Undergraduate)
Central Party School (Postgraduate)
These figures can be found on UN Comtrade’s website. To access the data quoted above, use the following configuration:
HS (as reported) Commodity Codes = TOTAL
Periods = 2022
Reporters = China
Partners = Madagascar
2nd Partner = World
Trade flows = All
Modes of transport = TOTAL modes of transport
Procedure codes = TOTAL custom procedure codes
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