Summary:
Zhang Bin (张斌), the new Chinese Ambassador to Angola, arrived on 23 Feb 2024
He is an expert on African affairs and has previous experience in Angola
China’s primary interests in Angola are almost all energy-related
China and Angola recently signed an agreement for the promotion and mutual protection of investments
Angola also recently announced it was leaving OPEC, which could be an opportunity for China to expand its involvement in Angola’s energy sector
The US has started challenging China’s influence in Angola by investing in new infrastructure projects
On 23 February, Zhang Bin arrived in Angola to take up his post as the new Chinese Ambassador, replacing Gong Tao, who left in August last year. This is the second time Zhang has been posted to Angola, with his previous stint concluding in 2013. This is, however, Zhang’s first time ever holding the title of Ambassador.
Angola has been a major source of oil for China for many years. Whilst in recent years China has sourced most of its oil from the Middle East and Russia, Angola remains an important supplier. For example, in 2022, China imported 30 million tonnes of crude petroleum from Angola, or $22.6 billion worth. When Zhang Bin was last in Angola, in 2013, China was importing around 40 million tonnes per year, or $31.8 billion worth1.
China, on the other hand, has become an important source of finance for Angola. Indeed, according to AidData’s recently published Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, between the years of 2000 and 2021, after adjusting for inflation, China provided Angola with $65.1 billion worth of loans and grants, the highest amount in Africa.
Quantifying this amount is not an exact science, and other organisations have quoted different figures. For example, the Global Development Policy Center, estimated the total amount of loans provided by China between 2000 and 2022 to be closer to $45 billion.
Regardless of which measure you use; it is clear that China has significant financial ties with Angola. The World Bank’s International Debt Statistics database shows that, in 2022, China held around one third of Angola’s total outstanding external debt stock of $60 billion.
Many of the loans provided by Chinese institutions have been backed by Angola’s oil resources. Indeed, China’s pioneering of oil-backed loans in Angola led to the process of linking the repayment of loans with natural resources being referred to as the “Angola Mode” or “Angola Model”.
There has been some speculation that the era of the so-called “Angola model” was coming to an end, with a noticeable drop in Chinese nationals in Angola, declining reliance on Angolan oil, and fewer projects being announced.
Recent developments, however, indicate that Zhang Bin’s arrival has come at a time of renewed interest in China-Angola cooperation.
In December 2023, China and Angola signed an agreement for the promotion and mutual Protection of investment in an effort to help stimulate more Chinese foreign direct investment into the African nation. The agreement covers investment protection obligations and dispute settlement mechanisms.
Just two weeks after the deal’s announcement, it was revealed that Angola was withdrawing from OPEC, a decision which Reuters suggests will also open the door for more Chinese involvement in Angola.
Angola’s government is certainly keen for more Chinese investment into its energy sector. At the Angola Oil & Gas Business Forum 2023, which was hosted in Beijing in August last year, bidding opportunities for 12 major oil and gas blocks were announced, and it was clear that Angola wanted Chinese companies to submit bids.
As China’s new ambassador, Zhang will certainly be well-positioned to help facilitate the revitalisation of China’s presence in Angola.
Whilst China has not published an official CV for Zhang Bin, publicly available information shows that Zhang has a wealth of experience working on China-Africa relations. He has spent time working in Africa as a diplomat and has also held senior roles within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department of African Affairs. See the end of this article for more information on Zhang’s background.
Zhang Bin’s previous experience in Angola will mean that he is already familiar with the country’s political landscape. His time spent in Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer, will likely also prove useful when advocating for Chinese energy interests. Lastly, having recently served as Deputy Director General of the MFA’s Department of African Affairs, Zhang will certainly be well-versed in China’s current diplomatic goals in Angola, as well as Africa as a whole.
What will Zhang’s priorities be in the near future? First, Zhang will want to make sure that the mutual investment protection agreement signed in December 2023 is properly implemented. Second, Zhang will need to make sure upcoming Chinese projects, such as China National Chemical Engineering’s recent deal to build the long-awaited Lobito Refinery, are receiving the support they require and do not face unexpected political obstacles. To achieve this, Zhang will be working closely with his embassy’s Commercial Counsellor, Lu Yuzhong, who was sent by China’s Ministry of Commerce to Angola at the end of 2022.
It will be interesting to see how China-Angola relations develop during Zhang’s time in office, especially since the US has recently begun making overtures in an attempt to counteract Chinese influence in Angola. Will China manage to retain its position there? Or will the US manage to win over Angola’s favour by financing new infrastructure projects? Only time will tell.
Zhang Bin (张斌) CV*:
2011 - 2013: Counsellor | Chargé d'Affaires, Chinese Embassy in Angola
2013 - 2015: Counsellor | Deputy Chief of Mission, Chinese Embassy in Nigeria
2015 - 2018: Counsellor | Chargé d'Affaires, Chinese Embassy in Finland
? - 2021: Counsellor, Department of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2021 - 2024: Deputy Director General, Department of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2024 - Present: Chinese Ambassador to Angola
*Information was compiled using open-source data and is missing some details. Complete accuracy cannot be guaranteed.
Note: links in this article have been archived and can be accessed over at the Internet Archive if any of them break.
These figures can be found on UN Comtrade’s website, to access the data quoted above, use the following configuration:
HS (as reported) Commodity Codes = 2709000
Periods = 2013, 2022
Reporters = China
Partners = Angola
2nd Partner = World
Trade flows = Import
Modes of transport = TOTAL modes of transport
Procedure codes = TOTAL custom procedure codes
Breakdown mode = Plus
Aggregate by = None