Analysis: China's diplomatic goals in Zimbabwe

Insights into Zhou Ding's first few weeks as Ambassador

It has been three months since Zhou Ding (周鼎), China’s new Ambassador to Zimbabwe, assumed his post in Harare. After arriving, Zhou wasted no time in establishing connections with Zimbabwe’s political elite. This article assesses Zhou’s activities within the context of China’s interests in Zimbabwe.

Zhou Ding, originally from Liaoning Province, was born in April 1969. He is a seasoned diplomat with overseas postings to Vietnam, the US, and Albania. He has also held multiple positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in China, first at the Consular Department, and later in the Personnel Department. Zhou’s full CV is provided at the end of the article.

Zhou’s recent posting to Zimbabwe is his first in Africa. Despite his lack of direct regional knowledge, his experience at the PetroChina Overseas Exploration and Development Corporation will likely help navigate the nuances of Zimbabwe’s natural resources sector, a core element of China – Zimbabwe relations.

Trade between China and Zimbabwe has grown significantly over the past two decades. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity¹, in 2021 China exported $992m worth of goods to Zimbabwe and imported $537m worth in return, including $280m of raw tobacco, $128m of chromium ore, and $70.6m of nickel. To understand China’s future priorities in Zimbabwe, however, it would be better to review China’s recent foreign direct investment (FDI).

Indeed, analysis of Zimbabwe Investment and Development Agency’s (ZIDA) 2023 quarterly reports shows that China is heavily investing in lithium production. Zimbabwe has Africa’s largest lithium reserves². In Q1³, 33 of the 42 investor licences granted for lithium related mining projects were given to Chinese investors. In Q2⁴, 45 more investor licences for mining projects were granted to investors from China, although it is not clear how many of these were related to lithium. For the first half of 2023, 160 of the 287 new investment licences issued in Zimbabwe were granted to Chinese investors, with 90 licences for mining projects.

In both quarters, Chinese investment into the sector far outweighed any other country, in both the number of projects and total investment value. Reuters reports that Chinese mining companies have spent $1b in the past 2 years acquiring and developing lithium mining and processing projects in Zimbabwe⁵. Chinese investors also agreed a $2.8b deal in 2022 to construct a battery metals industrial park⁶. Since Zimbabwe’s ban on raw lithium exports⁷, investment into lithium processing will become necessary for those looking to export the mineral.

China’s lithium aspirations were also apparent at this year's Zimbabwe – China Business Forum in Beijing, held in May 2023. Indeed, ZIDA’s Q2 report describes Agency representatives being taken to a battery production plant and a Great Wall Motors plant, “to get an appreciation of the use of some of the country's mineral products – mainly lithium”.

In addition to mineral projects, China is also a key player in Zimbabwe’s energy infrastructure, with Chinese firms financing and constructing multiple energy projects⁸ ⁹. Current proposed projects include a 2400-megawatt hydroelectric power station¹⁰ and a 1000-megawatt floating solar plant¹¹.

Despite a looming election, Zhou spent the first few weeks of his post establishing relationships with key government officials, including:

• Emmerson Mnangagwa, President¹²

• Constantino Chiwenga, Vice-President¹³

• Frederick Shava, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade¹⁴

• James Manzou, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹⁵

• Winston Chitando, Minister of Mines and Mining Development¹⁶

• Soda Zhemu, Minister of Energy and Power Development¹⁷

• Anxious Masuka, Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement¹⁸

• Mthuli Ncube, Finance Minister¹⁹

• Regina Chinamasa_, Commissioner General Zimbabwe Revenue Authority²⁰

• Felix Mhona, Minister of Transport and Infrastructure²¹

• Jacob Francis Mudenda, Speaker of the House of Representatives²²

• Ziyambi Ziyambi, Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs²³

• Godwin Matanga, Commissioner-General of the Zimbabwe Republic Police²⁴

• Monica Mutsvangwa, Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services²⁵

Just like with China’s FDI, it is possible to infer Chinese interests in Zimbabwe by looking at the list of government ministers above as it reflects China’s interests in mineral production and energy projects, which require infrastructure development, law enforcement, as well as favourable legislation, taxation and news coverage. Most telling was the fact that Zhou’s first set of meetings (aside from with the President) were with the Ministers for mining, agriculture, and international trade.

The fact that Frederick Shava, Zimbabwe’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade²⁶, served as Zimbabwe’s Ambassador to China from 2007 to 2014²⁷, is likely benefiting China’s efforts to expand trade with the country.

It will be important for China to be able to influence, in some way, the development of Zimbabwe’s lithium related policies, especially considering that Zimbabwe’s Minister of Mines and Mining Development stated in May 2023 that he may impose a tax on the export of lithium concentrates in the future, as a way of promoting the production of battery-grade lithium in Zimbabwe²⁸.

The outcome of August’s election in Zimbabwe will have been closely monitored by China. Nelson Chamisa, the leader of Zimbabwe’s main opposition, is a critic of Chinese involvement in Zimbabwe²⁹ and a Chamisa Government would not have been as willing to embrace Chinese investment as the current regime. Despite Chamisa having strong support during opinion polling, factors such as voter disenfranchisement, disparate party funding, and election tampering led many to believe that the election was a foregone conclusion³⁰. This is perhaps the reason Zhou did not wait for the outcome before establishing relationships with Zimbabwe’s politicians, several of whom have been in various positions of power for many years. After the results were known, Zhou personally delivered a message from Xi Jinping to President Mnangagwa congratulating him on his re-election³¹.

In short, since his appointment, Zhou’s focus has been on establishing relationships with government officials that relate to China’s key interests in Zimbabwe, with the main priority being the development of lithium production. In the future, Zhou will need to use these new relationships to ensure the success of Chinese investments in the sector and a continued increase in lithium exports.

China’s drive to secure the supply of minerals needed for the production of lithium-ion batteries will likely be influencing its agenda in other countries too, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Indeed, just weeks after arriving in his post, China’s new Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo paid a visit to the country’s southern provinces, which produce a combined 60 percent of the world’s cobalt³², for the specific purpose of meeting with local and Chinese stakeholders³³.

Zhou Ding’s CV

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1992 – 1995: Staff Member, Department of Consular Affairs, MFA

1995 – 1997: Consular Attaché, Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City

1997 – 2003 *: Attaché, Third Secretary, Deputy Director of the Personnel Department, MFA

2003 – 2004: Studied at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA

2004 – 2010: Consul and Deputy Consul General of the Consulate General in Houston

2010 – 2011: Counsellor, Personnel Department, MFA

2011 – 2013: Deputy General Manager of PetroChina Overseas Exploration and Development Corporation

2013 – 2019: Counsellor and Deputy Director, Personnel Department, MFA

2019 – 2023: Ambassador to the Republic of Albania

2023 – Present: Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe³⁴

*Whilst Zhou’s official CV indicates that he left his role at the Personnel Department in 2003 before then commencing his studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, further investigation shows Zhou had been listed with his Deputy Director job title whilst participating in a roundtable event run by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in May 2004³⁵. Therefore, it is likely that Zhou continued working in some capacity whilst at Tuft University.

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