China's Diplomacy by Sea
China's Diplomacy by Sea
What is the purpose of China's naval goodwill visits?
Edit 22/11/2023: this article has been updated to include hospital ship Daishan Dao’s Harmonious Mission-2023 as one of the goodwill tours conducted by China this year, bringing the total tours up from four to five and total visits from 17 to 22.
China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has conducted at least 22 goodwill visits to different countries around the world so far this year, from Southeast Asia to the Persian Gulf and West Africa. These visits are an important part of China’s diplomatic machinery.
International Relations scholar Ken Booth defined naval goodwill visits as “a specific attempt to cultivate the host country, with the hope of accumulating diplomatic capital”1. The content of goodwill visits varies, but can consist of welcome receptions, ship tours, cultural performances, and more. China’s goodwill visits also often coincide with joint naval exercises.
For nearly 40 years, China has been sending its navy on goodwill visits, beginning in 1985, when China sent a destroyer and supply ship to visit Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh2. In 1997, Chinese destroyer Harbin (112) made history as the first ever Chinese naval ship to visit the US mainland3. Chinese destroyer Shenzhen (167) made China’s first ever goodwill visit to Africa in 20004 and, in 2001, China’s first ever goodwill visit to Europe5.
Since then, the frequency of goodwill naval visits has increased, thanks partly to the anti-piracy taskforce China has sustained in and around the Gulf of Aden since 20086, meaning that the PLA Navy now transits Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean on a regular basis, supported by China’s base in Djibouti (in fact, China has been using Djibouti as a location for replenishment and repair since 20107, a full 7 years before its base was officially launched).
So far in 2023, China’s PLA Navy has successfully completed five separate goodwill tours, three in Southeast Asia, one in the Persian Gulf and one on the west coast of Africa. Two of these tours were conducted by China’s anti-piracy escort taskforces, the other two were conducted by the training ship Qi Jiguang.
In May and June, Qi Jiguang paid good will visits to Vietnam8, Thailand9, Brunei10, and the Philippines11.
In June and July, the 43rd Escort Taskforce paid goodwill visits to Côte d'Ivoire12, Ghana13, Nigeria14, Gabon15, and the Republic of Congo16.
From July to Sept, Chinese hospital ship Daishan Dao visited Kiribati17, Tonga18, Vanuatu19, the Solomon Islands20, and East Timor21 for its Harmonious-2023 mission.
In Sept and Oct, Qi Jiguang headed from Qingdao to Indonesia22, then to Papua New Guinea23, and Fiji24.
Finally, from Oct to November, the 44th Escort Taskforce spent time touring the Persian Gulf, visiting Oman25, Kuwait26, Qatar27, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)28.
In addition to these tours, at the conclusion of this year’s Chinese-Russian joint naval exercises “Northern Joint-2023”, Chinese vessels also paid a goodwill visit to Vladivostok, however as this visit was not part of a goodwill tour, it was not included on the above map29.
In addition to the tours conducted by the training ship Qi Jiguang and the 43rd and 44th Escort Taskforces, China’s hospital ship regularly conducts what China calls “Harmonious Missions”. This year’s Harmonious Mission toured Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. A full analysis of China’s Hamonious Missions will be provided in a follow-up article.
The PLA Navy likely has multiple reasons for conducting goodwill visits, taking into consideration both soft and hard power.
First, these visits are good for public diplomacy. Cultural exchanges, ship tours, and other light-hearted public events are effective public diplomacy tools which can help improve China’s image locally.
Second, goodwill visits help develop or reaffirm bilateral relations. By using the visit to meet with local military and political leaders, China’s PLA Navy is able to better acquaint themselves with local elites. China’s goodwill visits often also coincide with joint naval exercises with the host nation, which help further develop friendly bilateral relations.
Third, goodwill visits help build China’s image as a maritime power. When China first began conducting goodwill naval visits, the PLA Navy was considered to be a coastal navy. Indeed, in 2001, Dr Probal Ghosh, a retired captain from the Indian Navy who then became a scholar specialising in maritime security, wrote that
“a recently publicised goodwill visit of a Chinese Song class submarine and accompanying warships to Indian Ocean ports had some regional navies in a tizzy. Perhaps the underlying message of the visit, seemingly, was that the Chinese were trying to show their 'presence' in the ocean and were saying that they had enough capability to roam the Indian Ocean freely. For the Chinese, it was an upbeat moment since their navy is perceived to be a coastal one”30.
Over the years, China’s goodwill visits have provided the PLA Navy with ample opportunity to demonstrate the progress it has made in modernisation.
In addition to the above reasons, this year’s goodwill visits may have had another motive: namely, China’s on-going search for new naval bases. For example, this year’s visits to the UAE and Gabon may have been used to give Chinese navy vessels an excuse to visit locations that are said to be potential PLA Naval bases31.
Earlier this year, it was reported by the Washington Post that build-up had resumed at a suspected Chinese military site in the UAE, starting in December 202232. The project had supposedly been halted after the US expressed its concerns about the project with the UAE in late 202133, however, a leaked report obtained by the Washington Post indicated that construction had since resumed.
A goodwill visit from the PLA Navy would have been useful cover for any vessels wishing to visit the site. This visit was the PLA Navy’s sixth visit to the UAE34, starting with a goodwill visit in 201035.
The same Washington Post article named Gabon as another potential location for a PLA Navy base. In 2023, it certainly appeared that a base was on the cards, with China-Gabon relations developing rapidly.
In January, then-Foreign Minister Qin Gang visited Gabon36.
In April, President Bongo visited China and met with President Xi Jinping, where they elevated their bilateral relations from a “comprehensive cooperative partnership” to a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership”37
In June, the Commander of the PLA Navy, Admiral Dong Jun, visited Gabon where he met with President Ali Bongo. Reports suggest they had a constructive discussion that “laid the foundations for enhanced cooperation in key sectors such as defence, maritime security and capacity building”38.
In July, whilst Gabon’s Foreign Minister was in Beijing attending a forum and meeting bilaterally with Foreign Minister Wang Yi39, the 43rd Escort Taskforce paid a goodwill visit to Gabon, which lasted 4 days40.
After Bongo’s deposition on 30 August, Africa Intelligence reported that Beijing had indeed secured a deal with Gabon, however the coup d'état had put the deal on hold41. It is not yet known what the fate of the agreement is, however, China’s Ambassador to Gabon has been very proactive in establishing good relations with the transitional government (see more information here).
In conclusion, PLA Navy goodwill visits are an important part of China’s diplomatic machinery. These visits help China improve its public image, develop bilateral relationships, and demonstrate the PLA Navy’s ability to reach the far corners of the ocean. In addition, this year’s set of goodwill tours have demonstrated that these visits can provide convenient cover for any PLA Navy vessel that may wish to visit potential base locations.
References
Booth, K. (2014). Navies and Foreign Policy (Routledge Revivals) Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315769646. Pg. 45.