Before shifting our focus to Q2, let us take a moment to recap Q1.

Whilst 2024 has been relatively slow so far, China’s diplomatic network still saw a number of important developments in Q1.

By my count, 13 ambassadorial posts were made vacant in the first 3 months of 20241, including three vice-ministerial-level posts, namely, to South Africa, the EU, and the UN.

As for arrivals, only 8 Chinese ambassadors took office in Q1. After starting the year with a quick succession of appointments, the rate of new appointees slowed dramatically. Whilst it had been reported by Bloomberg that Fu Cong will be filling the vacant post at the UN, as of writing he has not yet taken office.

The locations that did receive a new Chinese ambassador this quarter were: Samoa, Qatar, Albania, Bolivia, Angola, Singapore, Panama, and Madagascar. All of which have strategic importance to China, albeit for different reasons. Some are important natural resource exporters, whilst others have geostrategic value.

Of the new arrivals, the most experienced appointee has to be Cao Zhongming, Ambassador to Singapore, who was until recently China’s Ambassador to Belgium.

For the majority of the Q1 cohort, this will be their first time serving as an ambassador, with only 3 having prior ambassadorial experience. At 58 years old, Cao Zhongming is the oldest of the cohort, and at 48 years old, Wang Liang (Ambassador to Bolivia) is by far the youngest. Overall, the average age of the cohort was 54.

As for gender balance, only 2 of the new arrivals were women.

Thus far, I have written articles about 6 of Q1’s new arrivals. In case you missed any, you can find them here:

In short, Q1 2024 saw more Chinese ambassadors vacate their posts than anything else.

If China is going to appoint as many ambassadors in 2024 as they did in 2023, then the rate of arrivals in Q1 was lower than one would expect. That being said, with so many ambassadorial posts currently vacant, it looks like there will be a lot of arrivals in Q2.

Whilst there have been no new arrivals in Q2 yet, we have already seen China’s ambassadors to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Botswana all begin the process of vacating their posts.

Make sure to keep an eye out for future updates from China Diplomatic Digest in Q2.

• Ji Ping (季平) is China’s new Ambassador to Madagascar

• Previously, Ji was the Chinese Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina

• Madagascar has been part of the Belt and Road Initiative since 2017

• China is a major customer of Malagasy graphite

• Most of China’s infrastructure projects in Madagascar have been road developments

• Malagasy debt to China is increasing steadily but remains relatively low

• China is interested in cooperating with Madagascar on more road development and energy projects

• Ji Ping has experience promoting these types of projects from his time in Bosnia and Herzegovina

On 12 March, Ji Ping arrived in Madagascar to take up his new role as ambassador. Prior to his appointment, Ji had been serving as Chinese Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Ji is not your typical career diplomat, as he has spent half of his career working in the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee. From 2011 to 2016, he also served as the Deputy Secretary-General of the China Peace and Development Foundation, a charitable organisation that is overseen by the Party.

For more information on Ji Ping’s career, see the end of this article.

Ji’s arrival in Madagascar has come at a time of increased China-Madagascar cooperation. The number of Chinese infrastructure projects in Madagascar is growing and China is making efforts to stimulate bilateral trade, with 98% of Malagasy exports to China now tariff free as of December 2023.

China-Madagascar trade

Trade volume: ~ $2.1 billion (2022)

Exports (to China): $625 million (2022)

Main products exported to China: Raw Nickel, Thorium, Graphite, Zirconium, Cobalt, Crude Mica

Imports (from China): $1.45 billion (2022)

Source: UN Comtrade1

Despite dominating the global supply of graphite, China has been steadily increasing its graphite imports, and Madagascar is a major supplier. Since 2017, import volume of Malagasy graphite has increased from 3.01 kilotonnes in 2017 to 51.16 kilotonnes in 2022. The only country exporting more graphite to China is Mozambique.

Early in 2024, a deal was struck between graphite producer Etablissements Gallois S.A. and Shandong Hi-Speed Road & Bridge Co Ltd for a broad scope agreement relating to graphite mining projects. Malagasy graphite is evidently becoming more important to China.

As stated above, the number of infrastructure projects in Madagascar involving Chinese companies is also increasing. For example, in April 2023, it was announced that China Eximbank would provide a $240 million preferential loan for the long-planned Ranomafana hydroelectric power plant, with Sinohydro set to carry out the construction.

Ji's predecessor Guo Xiaomei described it as ‘the largest financing cooperation project between China and Madagascar since the establishment of diplomatic relations’.

Despite joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in March 2017, big ticket Chinese infrastructure projects in Madagascar have been slow to progress. For example, in 2017, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) signed a deal to build a port in Madagascar’s Narinda bay, however little has been heard of the project since.

For a short while, a Chinese company was also expecting to redevelop Madagascar’s main port in Toamasina. The original contract had been agreed in 2015, with the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) reportedly signing a $1.2 billion deal for the expansion. However, it was revealed in March 2017 that Madagascar had gone for a cheaper option using a loan from Japan (and using Japanese companies for construction).

Aside from China’s involvement in Madagascar’s on-going efforts to modernise its telecommunications network, most new projects have focused on developing Madagascar’s road network, which is something that China has been doing long before Madagascar joined the BRI.

Recent examples of Chinese roads include the Ivato-Tsarasaotra Road to Ivato International Airport, the expressway linking Ivato International Airport and the Boulevard de l'Europe, the 151.7 km rehabilitation project of the RN5A, and the Tamatave Port Expressway

The lack of any large flagship projects has led analysts such as Veronika Blablová, writing for the China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe, to comment that Madagascar ‘seems to be immune to Chinese proposals for huge infrastructural projects’.

Madagascar may have rejected some of China’s proposals, however, Malagasy debt to China is still on track to exceed $500 million within the next few years. That being said, at least for now, the proportion of Chinese debt remains relatively low. Nevertheless, the recent upward spike will have some concerned that China’s influence there is growing.

China also wants to expand its involvement in Madagascar’s energy transition, which is a priority for the developing nation.

For example, it is possible a Chinese company could win the proposed 200MW Ihazolava solar PV power project, which Madagascar opened up for tender in 2023. As of writing this article, it is not yet clear which company won the contract.

At a recent meeting with Malagasy President Andry Rajoelina, Ji mentioned both hydropower and solar as examples of the types of projects China is interested in supporting. At this meeting, Chinese media reported that Rajoelina also referred to China as Madagascar’s ‘priority partner’.

During Ji Ping’s time in Bosnia and Herzegovina, China increased its involvement in the country’s energy sector, with deals being reached relating to hydropower, solar, and wind projects. Contracts for several road development projects were also won by Chinese companies, including the 33 km Vukosavlje-Brcko section and the 17 km Brcko-Bijeljina section of a highway planned in northern Bosnia.

Ji therefore does have experience advocating for the sorts of projects that China is interested in promoting in Madagascar.

Based on Ji Ping’s track record, China will likely continue making steady progress. That being said, there are a number of factors that may hinder China’s efforts, such as competing tender bids from other countries or even opposition from the local Malagasy population. Ji’s performance, therefore, will depend on more than just his past experience.

Ji recently stated that, as part of his effort to further promote China-Madagascar cooperation, he will be meeting with people from a variety of different Malagasy government departments to get their input. It is therefore possible we could see an expansion of Chinese involvement into other sectors in Madagascar in the future.

Ji Ping’s CV

1990 - 2006: Deputy Director, Director, Assistant Director and Deputy Director, Bureau No. 1 (Asia), International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

2006 - 2007: Assistant to the Mayor of Weifang City, Shandong Province

2009 - 2011: Counselor, Chinese Embassy, India

2011 - 2016: Deputy Secretary-General, China Peace and Development Foundation

2016 - 2018: Deputy Director and Director of the Protocol Bureau of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee

2019 - 2024: Chinese Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina

2024 - Present: Chinese Ambassador to Madagascar

Education

Peking University (Undergraduate)

Central Party School (Postgraduate)

Sources: 1, 2

• Xu Xueyuan has been appointed China’s Ambassador to Panama

• Previously, Xu was the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Chinese Embassy in the US

• China and Panama established bilateral relations in 2017 and ties initially developed rapidly

• After Panama’s 2019 election, China struggled to make any further progress

• 2024 will see another election in Panama, however it is unlikely that the current status quo will change

• Xu’s appointment indicates that China wants an ambassador in Panama that has more experience dealing with the United States

On 11 March, Xu Xueyuan arrived in Panama to assume her new post as ambassador. Previously, Xu had been serving as Deputy Chief of Mission at the Chinese Embassy in the United States.

Xu’s predecessor, Wei Qiang, had been serving as ambassador since 2017. He was China’s first Ambassador to Panama and had been appointed not long after bilateral relations were first established.

Evan Ellis, who is a research professor of Latin American studies at the US Army War College, once described Wei Qiang as one of China’s ‘most talented ambassadors’, and for the first 18 months of Wei’s term, China and Panama’s relations developed at an incredible pace.

In November 2017, President Juan Carlos Varela travelled to China to meet Xi Jinping and attend the official opening of Panama’s embassy in Beijing. A whole host of new agreements were signed during Varela’s visit, including an MoU on the Belt and Road Initiative, making Panama the first Latin American country to sign on.

Panama’s Vice President and Foreign Minister Isabel Saint Malo told local Panamanian newspaper La Prensa that “[c]ommissions and teams have been formed on all [China-related] issues [so they could] move forward as quickly as possible”.

Momentum continued throughout 2018, with Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations progressing rapidly. Xi Jinping also made a short 24-hour state visit to Panama in November that year. More agreements were signed during the visit.

Alvaro Mendez, a Senior Research Fellow at the London School of Economics once wrote that ‘the pace of the negotiations towards this [FTA] could well have set a world record’.

China had plans to even build an embassy near the entrance of the canal, however local and US opposition led to the offer of land being withdrawn.

It was clear that the US was alarmed at Panama’s flourishing relationship with China.

The value of Panama to US international trade and security cannot be understated, and any perceived threat to Panama’s neutrality is taken very seriously. The fact that China has never signed the ‘Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal’ — which has been open to accession since 1979 — will not have been forgotten by the US.

In Oct 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo travelled to meet with Panama’s President and Vice President. The New York Times reported that Pompeo wanted to convey the message that ‘when China comes calling, it’s not always to the good of your citizens’.

China’s progress in Panama began to stall in 2019, with the turning point being the election of President Laurentino Cortizo. Because Panamanian Presidents are not permitted to run for consecutive re-election, Varela’s time in office had come to an end.

Whilst Cortizo denied that he was ‘cooling’ relations with China, his government wasted no time putting the brakes on several of Varela’s projects, including the proposed $4 billion BRI-linked Panama City-David Railway, as well as the China-Panema FTA negotiations.

Whilst by no means openly anti-China, observers suggested that Cortizo’s government was placing more emphasis on Panama’s ties with the US, and that it was distancing itself from China.

In 2021, a joint venture led by Chinese company Landbridge had its consession for the Panama Colon Container Port cancelled by the Panama Maritime Authority. The reason given was contractual non-compliance. The project was reportedly 40% complete at the time.

It was not all bad news, however. Some major China-related projects did proceed, including the recently completed $1.3 billion fourth bridge over the canal and the delayed Amador cruise terminal.

Also in 2021, Hong Kong-based Hutchison Ports Holdings was also able to renew its 25-year concession to run the Panama Ports Company, which operates Panama’s Balboa and Cristobal ports. This was even after an audit from the Panamanian authorities.

On the trade front, UN Comtrade data shows that trade volume between Panama and China has risen significantly since 2017. Imports from China grew from $6.6 billion in 2017 to $12.6 billion in 2022.

During the same period, Panamanian exports to China increased from $62 million to $1.2 billion. Further analysis of the data shows that China has become the main destination of Panamanian copper.

Cortizo announced in 2022 that Panama was going to restart FTA negotiations with China, however, there has been little mention of it since.

As 2024 is an election year in Panama, will we see a return of the pre-2019 approach to China after Cortizo leaves office? Probably not. Jose Raul Mulino, the current front runner, would likely continue Cortizo’s balanced approach.

During the last presidential election, whilst supportive of relations with China, Mulino spoke critically of Varela’s hasty approach. He also did not want Panama to get drawn into the US-China trade war.

Not all hope is lost for China, however. For example, presidential candidate Martin Torrijos recently remarked that 'we have a relationship with China and we have to try to take advantage of it for the benefit of Panama'.

Whilst recent polls show that Torrijos is currently trailing behind Mulino, there is a possibility that Mulino will be excluded from the race, which would give Torrijos a chance to win. Mulino only recently replaced ex-President Ricardo Martinelli as the Achieving Goals party's candidate after Martinelli was himself banned from the election.

Regardless of who wins the election in Panama, China will still need to contend with the US for influence.

Richard Koster, a Panama-based American author and journalist, told Dialogo Chino that the threat of US visa denial or the inclusion on the ‘Clinton list’ (OFAC Sanctions List) is an effective way of exerting control over Panamanian politicians.

Whilst Cortizo has rebuked claims that he received pressure from the US, it would help explain Panama’s sudden change in its approach towards China in 2019.

It is also possible that the ‘US factor’ was the reason Xu Xueyuan was selected as ambassador. Despite having less experience than Wei Qiang, both as an ambassador and with Latin American affairs, Xu is an expert on the US and has spent most of her nearly 30-year career working in related roles. See the end of this article for more details of Xu’s career.

Perhaps Wei Qiang was too effective at promoting Chinese interests with the Varela Government, and it was the hasty engagement that forced the US’s intervention. Xu’s appointment indicates that China is pivoting to a strategy that is more conscious of the US perspective.

Another factor weighing down China’s progress in Panama has been the Covid-19 pandemic. Whilst Chinese organisations (both government and private) did donate medical supplies to Panama during this time, Covid-19 restrictions will have prevented the bilateral exchanges needed for their relationship to develop further.

With the pandemic now over, China has resumed sending senior diplomats to Panama in an attempt to stimulate more cooperation.

In September 2023, Assistant Foreign Minister Hua Chunying visited Panama after attending a G77 + China meeting in Cuba. Visiting Panama at the same time was a delegation from the China International Development Cooperation Agency, who were there to evaluate several potential projects submitted by Panama.

Most recently, Qiu Xiaoqi, who is the Special Representative of the Chinese Government on Latin American Affairs, only just paid a visit to Panama in March 2024.

It is within this context that Xu Xueyuan has taken office.

Will a more cautious approach guided by Xu’s experience in the US enable a revitalisation of China-Panama bilateral cooperation? Will China be able to change the status quo following this year’s election?

One way to gauge China’s success will be if Panama restarts FTA negotiations or if any major infrastructure projects are announced. Regardless, any progress will need to be at a measured pace to avoid any US intervention.

Xu Xueyuan’s CV

1996 - 1998: Attaché > Third Secretary, Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

1998 - 2001: Third Secretary, Chinese Embassy in Trinidad and Tobago

2001 -2010: Third Secretary > Second Secretary > Deputy Director > First Secretary > Director, Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs, MFA

2010 -2011: Study overseas

2011 -2015: Counsellor, Chinese Embassy in the US

2015 -2018: Deputy Director-General, Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs, MFA

2018 - 2024: Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission, Chinese Embassy in the US

2024 - Present: Chinese Ambassador to Panama

Education:

Fudan University

Source

Note: If the URLs of any pages referenced in this article stop working, the archived versions can be found by searching for the page using the corresponding URL over at the Internet Archive.

• Cao Zhongming is set to become the next Chinese Ambassador to Singapore

• Until recently, Cao had been serving as the Chinese Ambassador to Belgium

• In 2023, Singapore and China upgraded their bilateral relations to ‘an all-round, high-quality, future-oriented partnership’

• Singapore has a close relationship with both China and the US

• Singapore could have a new Prime Minister in 2024

• This change in leadership will bring a degree of uncertainty for China

• Cao may have been selected because of his experience and assertiveness

On Sunday 10 March, Lianhe Zabao revealed that seasoned diplomat Cao Zhongming (曹忠明) has been confirmed to be the next Chinese Ambassador to Singapore. It was also reported that Cao is expected to arrive later this month. Previously, Cao had been serving as the Chinese Ambassador to Belgium, where he had been since late 2018.

The position in Singapore was made vacant in July 2023, after the previous ambassador, Sun Haiyan, returned to China to become a deputy minister of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

This will be Cao’s first time being posted to Southeast Asia, having spent most of his career outside of China in French-speaking countries in Europe, such as France and Belgium, as well as in Africa, with time spent in both Chad and Mali. For more information on Cao’s career, see the end of this article.

Since bilateral relations were established in 1990, China and Singapore have enjoyed strong ties, and the two countries have coordinated on a number of major projects, such as the Suzhou Industrial Park, the Tianjin Eco-City, and the Chongqing Connectivity Initiative. China is Singapore’s largest trading partner, and Singapore is a key participant in the Belt and Road Initiative.

In April 2023, China and Singapore’s relationship was upgraded to ‘an all-round, high-quality, future-oriented partnership’, which shows that the two countries plan to continue their close cooperation.

Singapore could have a new Prime Minister by the end of 2024, with Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong possibly being replaced by Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong as early as November.

Wong has already begun taking a leading role in managing bilateral relations with China, evidenced by the fact that he recently co-chaired the 19th Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation, the platform Singapore and China use to set the strategic direction of bilateral cooperation. He has already met both Chinese Premier Li Qiang and First Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang.

Under Prime Minister Lee’s leadership, Singapore has successfully navigated the US-China rivalry and has thus enjoyed a close economic and strategic relationship with both major powers.

Wong taking office will mark the beginning of a new era for Singaporean politics, which will be both an opportunity and a challenge for China. It will be an opportunity to push for closer ties with Singapore, and it will be a challenge because change brings a degree of uncertainty. As such, China might be concerned that Wong’s leadership could bring Singapore closer to the US.

For example, whilst Wong has already expressed support for ‘reinforced’ ties with China, he has also welcomed the expansion of Singapore’s partnership with the US.

Is this uncertainty one of the reasons why Cao Zhongming was chosen as ambassador? It is possible. Not only is Cao a seasoned diplomat, but his style can also be quite assertive. Any unfavourable change to the status quo in Singapore would likely be met with swift pushback from Cao. Indeed, whilst he was serving as Ambassador to Belgium, Cao’s assertive approach made headlines on several occasions.

In response to calls by Belgian MPs in 2020 for an independent investigation into the Covid-19 outbreak in China, Cao sent what Politico described as an 'angry' letter to one of the Belgian MPs involved, Theo Francken.

Els Van Hoof, who is the chairman of Belgium’s parliamentary foreign affairs committee, received her own letter in 2021 regarding a draft resolution that criticised Hong Kong’s national security law.

A year later, in 2022, Van Hoof once again received a letter from Cao over another resolution that this time called for de-escalation in the Taiwan Strait and condemned ‘Chinese aggression toward Taiwan’.

It is fair to suggest, therefore, that Cao could take a similar approach in Singapore, if he deems it necessary. That being said, Wong’s government will most likely want to continue to balance relations, therefore, Cao’s assertiveness may never be needed.

For now, all we can do is wait for Cao Zhongming to arrive and take up his new post.

Cao Zhongming’s CV1

Date of birth: October 1965

1982-1989: Student, Peking University

1989-1992: Staff member| Attaché, Department of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

1992-1995: Attaché | Third Secretary, Chinese Embassy in Chad

1995-2003: Deputy Director | Director | Counsellor, Department of African Affairs, MFA

2003-2006: Counsellor, Chinese Embassy in France

2006-2011: Deputy Director General, Department of African Affairs, MFA

2011-2014: Chinese Ambassador to Mali

2014-2015: Deputy Director General, Department of Personnel, MFA

2015-2018: Director General, Department of Personnel, MFA

2018-2024: Chinese Ambassador to Belgium

Education

Master of Laws, Peking University

• Zhang Bin (张斌), the new Chinese Ambassador to Angola, arrived on 23 Feb 2024

• He is an expert on African affairs and has previous experience in Angola

• China’s primary interests in Angola are almost all energy-related

• China and Angola recently signed an agreement for the promotion and mutual protection of investments

• Angola also recently announced it was leaving OPEC, which could be an opportunity for China to expand its involvement in Angola’s energy sector

• The US has started challenging China’s influence in Angola by investing in new infrastructure projects

On 23 February, Zhang Bin arrived in Angola to take up his post as the new Chinese Ambassador, replacing Gong Tao, who left in August last year. This is the second time Zhang has been posted to Angola, with his previous stint concluding in 2013. This is, however, Zhang’s first time ever holding the title of Ambassador.

Angola has been a major source of oil for China for many years. Whilst in recent years China has sourced most of its oil from the Middle East and Russia, Angola remains an important supplier. For example, in 2022, China imported 30 million tonnes of crude petroleum from Angola, or $22.6 billion worth. When Zhang Bin was last in Angola, in 2013, China was importing around 40 million tonnes per year, or $31.8 billion worth1.

China, on the other hand, has become an important source of finance for Angola. Indeed, according to AidData’s recently published Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, between the years of 2000 and 2021, after adjusting for inflation, China provided Angola with $65.1 billion worth of loans and grants, the highest amount in Africa.

Quantifying this amount is not an exact science, and other organisations have quoted different figures. For example, the Global Development Policy Center, estimated the total amount of loans provided by China between 2000 and 2022 to be closer to $45 billion.

Regardless of which measure you use; it is clear that China has significant financial ties with Angola. The World Bank’s International Debt Statistics database shows that, in 2022, China held around one third of Angola’s total outstanding external debt stock of $60 billion.

Many of the loans provided by Chinese institutions have been backed by Angola’s oil resources. Indeed, China’s pioneering of oil-backed loans in Angola led to the process of linking the repayment of loans with natural resources being referred to as the “Angola Mode” or “Angola Model”.

There has been some speculation that the era of the so-called “Angola model” was coming to an end, with a noticeable drop in Chinese nationals in Angola, declining reliance on Angolan oil, and fewer projects being announced.

Recent developments, however, indicate that Zhang Bin’s arrival has come at a time of renewed interest in China-Angola cooperation.

In December 2023, China and Angola signed an agreement for the promotion and mutual Protection of investment in an effort to help stimulate more Chinese foreign direct investment into the African nation. The agreement covers investment protection obligations and dispute settlement mechanisms.

Just two weeks after the deal’s announcement, it was revealed that Angola was withdrawing from OPEC, a decision which Reuters suggests will also open the door for more Chinese involvement in Angola.

Angola’s government is certainly keen for more Chinese investment into its energy sector. At the Angola Oil & Gas Business Forum 2023, which was hosted in Beijing in August last year, bidding opportunities for 12 major oil and gas blocks were announced, and it was clear that Angola wanted Chinese companies to submit bids.

As China’s new ambassador, Zhang will certainly be well-positioned to help facilitate the revitalisation of China’s presence in Angola.

Whilst China has not published an official CV for Zhang Bin, publicly available information shows that Zhang has a wealth of experience working on China-Africa relations. He has spent time working in Africa as a diplomat and has also held senior roles within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department of African Affairs. See the end of this article for more information on Zhang’s background.

Zhang Bin’s previous experience in Angola will mean that he is already familiar with the country’s political landscape. His time spent in Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer, will likely also prove useful when advocating for Chinese energy interests. Lastly, having recently served as Deputy Director General of the MFA’s Department of African Affairs, Zhang will certainly be well-versed in China’s current diplomatic goals in Angola, as well as Africa as a whole.

What will Zhang’s priorities be in the near future? First, Zhang will want to make sure that the mutual investment protection agreement signed in December 2023 is properly implemented. Second, Zhang will need to make sure upcoming Chinese projects, such as China National Chemical Engineering’s recent deal to build the long-awaited Lobito Refinery, are receiving the support they require and do not face unexpected political obstacles. To achieve this, Zhang will be working closely with his embassy’s Commercial Counsellor, Lu Yuzhong, who was sent by China’s Ministry of Commerce to Angola at the end of 2022.

It will be interesting to see how China-Angola relations develop during Zhang’s time in office, especially since the US has recently begun making overtures in an attempt to counteract Chinese influence in Angola. Will China manage to retain its position there? Or will the US manage to win over Angola’s favour by financing new infrastructure projects? Only time will tell.

Zhang Bin (张斌) CV*:

2011 - 2013: Counsellor | Chargé d'Affaires, Chinese Embassy in Angola

2013 - 2015: Counsellor | Deputy Chief of Mission, Chinese Embassy in Nigeria

2015 - 2018: Counsellor | Chargé d'Affaires, Chinese Embassy in Finland

? - 2021: Counsellor, Department of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

2021 - 2024: Deputy Director General, Department of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

2024 - Present: Chinese Ambassador to Angola

*Information was compiled using open-source data and is missing some details. Complete accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Note: links in this article have been archived and can be accessed over at the Internet Archive if any of them break.

• Wang Liang (王亮), the new Chinese Ambassador to Bolivia, arrived on 5 Jan 2024

• He specialises in Latin American affairs

• China’s main priorities in Bolivia are natural resource-related, with Chinese companies set to invest large sums into Bolivia’s lithium

• Previous attempts to commercialise Bolivia’s lithium fell through due to political instability

• Legal hurdles and the potential for widespread protest currently pose a threat to the new Chinese agreements signed in 2023

• It is likely, therefore, that Wang will seek to support the projects where he can so that they do not meet the same fate as the previous ones

In early January 2024, Bolivia welcomed a new Chinese Ambassador, Wang Liang (王亮). This is Wang’s first time serving as an ambassador, and at 48 years-old, he is relatively young for the role. Previously, Wang was serving as a Deputy Director-General of the Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs within China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

Whilst details of Wang’s career are limited, it can be confirmed that he also previously worked at the Chinese Embassy in Argentina for around three years, starting in 2015 as a Counselor before being promoted to Minister Counselor. For more details on Wang Liang’s career, see the end of this article.

Currently, China’s main priorities in Bolivia are mineral resources such as zinc, gold, and lithium. In line with rising global demand, China has become increasingly interested in Bolivia’s lithium, which it needs for the production of lithium-ion batteries. Last year, two major agreements were signed by Chinese companies for planned investments into Bolivia’s lithium industry, both in partnership with Bolivia’s state-owned lithium company Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB).

The first agreement was signed in January 2023, which saw a consortium of Chinese companies CATL, BRUNP and CMOC (CBC) agree to invest $1.4b to build two lithium extraction plants. The second was signed in June, where CITIC Guoan agreed to invest $857m into a project in the Uyuni salt flats. The only other agreement signed by YLB in 2023 was with the Russian Uranium One Group for a $600m investment in another lithium project.

Chinese companies have been involved in Bolivia’s recent efforts to capitalise on the country’s lithium reserves since as early as 2011. For context, Bolivia has the largest lithium reserves in the world, with 23 million tons, however, the country has struggled to move beyond pilot projects and small-scale production.

Prior to 2023, the closest a Chinese company had come to the commercial production of lithium in Bolivia was in early 2019, when Xinjiang TBEA was chosen to be a strategic partner of YLB for projects in the Coipasa and Pastos Grandes salt flats. This was the second major joint venture YLB had entered into, having made a similar agreement in 2018 with the German company ACI Systems Alemania (ACISA) for a project in Salar de Uyuni.

These ventures were short lived, however. Protests over lithium royalties fed into a political crisis caused by Bolivia’s 2019 election. Just days before ex-President Morales resigned, he cancelled the partnership with ACISA. Whilst some reports in 2020 suggested that the Chinese deal had survived, it is clear that the project did not progress any further.

Moving forward, Wang Liang and his colleagues at the Chinese embassy will be closely monitoring the progress of the current lithium projects so that they do not meet a similar fate.

The biggest threats to China’s lithium ambitions in Bolivia are lingering legal restrictions that prevent YLB from having private partnerships, as well as an unresolved dispute over royalties. There are currently two draft bills being deliberated by the Bolivian Senate that should address these problems, however, nothing has been passed yet.

If the dispute over royalties is not resolved, the influential Potosinista Civic Committee (Comcipo) might try to disrupt lithium production, just as they did in 2019. Indeed, when CBC’s venture was first announced, Comcipo came out in opposition. If Comcipo do not find the proposed changes to royalties satisfactory, this could spell trouble for the Chinese projects.

Looking at Wang’s recent activities, it is clear that lithium is a priority for him.

On 17 Jan, Wang attended a signing ceremony where the Chinese consortium CBC agreed to invest an additional $90m for a pilot plant that uses direct lithium extraction technology. Also in attendance was the Bolivian President, Vice President, as well as other government ministers. Sat next to Wang at the event was the President of YLB, Karla Calderón.

It was reported last week, that Wang Liang has already met with the Bolivia-based heads of several major Chinese enterprises, including CATL and CITIC Guoan.

As part of the Chinese embassy’s Chinese New Year celebrations, Wang recently paid a visit to Bolivia’s lithium-rich region of Potosí to meet with members of the local Chinese community. Whilst in Potosí, he also met with the police chiefs of both the province and city. During their meeting, Wang asked for them to provide assistance to the Chinese people in Potosí if necessary. Such assistance could be required if any more protests against lithium production take place.

Even though Wang has already paid a visit to Bolivia’s Minister of Mining and Metallurgy, because Bolivia’s state-owned lithium producer YLB actually falls under the purview of the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy, Wang will also want to establish a good relationship with the relevant Minister, Franklin Molina Ortiz.

The Bolivian Government must be feeling confident that the issues relating to YLB private partnerships and royalties will soon be overcome, as it recently launched another international tender for lithium projects. We should therefore expect to see more Chinese companies seek to capitalise on Bolivia’s vast lithium reserves in the future.

Wang Liang (王亮), Chinese Ambassador to Bolivia

Recent Career*:
2015 - 2018: Counselor | Minister Counselor | Chargé d'Affaires, Chinese Embassy in Argentina
2019 - 2023: Director of the General Office | Minister Counselor | Deputy Director-General, Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, MFA
2024 - Present: Chinese Ambassador to Bolivia

Education:
Bachelor of Arts, Department of Foreign Languages, Shanghai International Studies University

*Information compiled using open-source data and may be incomplete. Exact dates were also not always available.

Sources: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

As a member of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Samoa forms part of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) via the China-Oceania-South Pacific blue economic passage. In recent years, China has been seeking to increase its presence in the South Pacific, which has been cause for concern by the US and its allies.

Soon after his arrival in Samoa, Fei published an op-ed in the Samoa Observer titled ‘A shared future and a new chapter for China-Samoa relations’. Fei wrote that China ‘sincerely wishes to contribute more’ towards helping Samoa ‘realize the priorities’ of Samoa’s five-year National Plan, titled the ‘Pathway for the Development of Samoa'.

Samoa’s current five-year plan was launched in 2022 and lists 21 key priority areas, including social development, economic development, security, climate change, and infrastructure development.

If Fei Mingxing is planning to use Samoa’s five-year plan to frame and promote Chinese engagement, then, we as observers, can also use the plan to identify what Fei might be focusing on.

Prior to Fei’s arrival, China had already been engaged in several key priority areas of the five-year plan, including public health and agriculture. The purpose of this article is to focus on two other priority areas that could greatly increase China’s presence in the country, namely, tourism and infrastructure.

1. China-Samoa flights

The revitalisation of Samoa’s tourism industry is a key priority area of Samoa’s five-year plan. What role could China play in this revitalisation? By pushing for China-Samoa flights to be finally established, after many years of trying, Chinese tourists would be able to visit Samoa in far greater numbers.

From China’s perspective, Chinese tourism in Samoa could also make the country more susceptible to Chinese economic influence.

Over the years, several attempts have been made to establish flights from China, however, as it stands, there are currently no regular flights taking place.

The saga began in 2016 when China and Samoa signed an agreement that would allow for Chinese airlines to operate services to Samoa.

Initially, there was talk about starting with charter flights. In March 2019, it was announced that the first charter flight from China to Samoa was set to happen on 1 July that year, however, there is no evidence to suggest the flight ever took place.

During the pandemic, Samoa’s border closure from March 2020 to August 2022 made flights from China impossible. Chao Xiaoliang, who was Fei Mingxing’s predecessor, had not forgotten about the original agreement, however, writing in November 2021 that he hoped a direct flight could be established once the borders reopened.

In March 2023, the Hong Kong-based firm Travel Focus was appointed to help market Samoa as a travel destination in Hong Kong, Macau, and mainland China, with Samoa Royal Tours operating as the local agent. A series of weekly tours were planned to start in May, with Hainan Airlines set to operate charter flights directly from Haikou, China.

The first of these flights landed on 28 May, and it was heralded as the first direct flight from China to Samoa.

These tours were short lived, however, with just two being completed before the rest were postponed. The main reason given was that the frequency of the tours exceeded the number of charter operations allowed per month, as stipulated by Samoa’s civil aviation regulations.

In addition to this, it was revealed that the local operator (Samoa Royal Tours) was owned by the children of the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, La’auli Leuatea Schmidt, and that the company had only been incorporated just weeks before the tours began. This drew a lot of criticism on social media.

In response, the Samoan government reportedly severed ties with Travel Focus.

As it stands, word is that Hainan Airlines applied for a Foreign Air Operating Certificate in June 2023. This is according to Samoa’s Transport Minister, Olo Fiti Va’ai, who later claimed that flights would resume in September. These flights did not materialise, however.

Moving forward, in order to unlock the potential of Chinese tourism in Samoa, Fei Mingxing will want to finally resolve the issue of flights once and for all, starting with finding out what happened to Hainan Airlines’s certification. Direct flights would also have the added benefit of making it easier to transport Chinese workers to Samoa for infrastructure projects.

2. Secure a deal to redevelop the Asau Port

Another key priority of Samoa’s five-year plan is the upgrade of its wharf facilities and improvement of sea transport links. Currently, Samoa is exploring the prospect of redeveloping its wharf in Asau into a multipurpose transshipment port.

Until mid-2021, it appeared as if China was set to build a new port for Samoa in the Bay of Vaiusu. However, a change in government led to the project being shelved. Opponents said that the proposed scale of the port was beyond the needs of the country and that the nearly USD$100m price tag could not be justified. According to a World Bank database, in 2021, Samoa already owed China USD$161m from previous loans.

One major opponent of the Vaiusu Port Project was future-Prime Minister Fiame Naomi Mata’afa, mostly because of the scale and cost of the project. Another critic of the project, Samoan MP Faumuina Wayne Fong, went so far as to suggest that China was intending to also use the port for military purposes. This was denied by the Chinese embassy.

As expected, after taking office, Fiame put an end to the Vaiusu Port Project.

Several months after the launch of Samoa’s five-year plan in 2022, Fiame’s government announced that it had decided to revisit plans to redevelop Samoa’s Asau Port on Savai'i island, with the intention of making it a transshipment port and a backup international port.

Under the previous government, China had been involved with a plan to develop the Asau Port. This was first reported on in The Australian in 2018, which stated that ’discussions were under way with China to bankroll the redevelopment and expansion of the Asau Port’.

The project has struggled to progress beyond the planning stage, however, with the timeline progressing as follows:

• In 2019, China and Samoa signed an Exchange of Letters to undertake a feasibility study for dredging the Asau Port.

• In 2020, it was confirmed that Samoa had submitted a request for China to fund a project to redevelop the wharf in Asau and were waiting the result of the feasibility study, which had been delayed by border closures.

• When Prime Minister Fiame shelved the Vaiusu Port Project in 2021, the status of the Asau Port Project was not mentioned.

• In September 2022, it was reported that Samoa was revisiting the Asau Port redevelopment and that Samoa’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade was seeking funding for the project.

• In March 2023, the Samoan government said that it was still committed to the redevelopment plans, but this was dependent on being able to secure funding.

• In June 2023, Samoa launched its Transport and Infrastructure Sector Plan 2023-2028, which revealed that Samoa would conduct a feasibility study on future port developments, including an alternative international port, suggesting the Asau Port redevelopment was still in the planning stage.

It is not clear whether China is involved with Samoa’s renewed interest in the Asau Port redevelopment. However, considering that, in 2022, Samoa and China signed an Economic & Technical Cooperation Agreement ‘for projects to be determined’, China’s participation is certainly possible.

Given that the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) is currently contracted for an Asian Development Bank-backed upgrade of Samoa’s main port in Apia, it is also possible that CHEC has already thrown its hat into the ring for the Asau Port redevelopment.

The moment any Chinese involvement is announced, however, concerns will once again be raised about the port’s potential use by China’s navy. Many people suspect that China is seeking a military foothold in the South Pacific, and a redeveloped Asau Port could be an appealing choice.

Would Samoa allow China’s PLA Navy to use the Asau Port in exchange for helping fund the redevelopment? Whilst the offer may be tempting, it seems unlikely. It is known that Prime Minister Fiame is apprehensive about giving China too much influence in Samoa, and allowing for Asau to become a dual-purpose facility would sail Samoa straight into China’s sphere of influence.

In short, direct flights from China and the Asau Port redevelopment are just two ways China can use the ‘Pathway for the Development of Samoa' to frame and promote Chinese engagement in the country. Both of which would also help China increase its influence there.

Whilst Fiame’s government has been fairly wary of growing Chinese influence, she has not completely shut the door on cooperation. It will, therefore, be Fei’s job to increase bilateral engagement back up to pre-pandemic levels.

Fei Mingxing (费明星)

Career (past 20 years):
2003 - 2005: First Secretary, Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
2005 - 2006: Consul, Chinese Consulate in Brisbane
2006 - 2010: Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission, Chinese Embassy in Fiji
2010 - 2015: Counselor and Division Director, Consular Department, MFA
2015 - 2018: Counselor | Minister Counselor, Chinese Embassy in the United Kingdom
2018 - 2023: Chinese Consul General in Durban, South Africa
2023: Counselor, Consular Department, MFA
2024 - Present: Chinese Ambassador to Samoa

Education:
Studied English at Southwest Normal University (1984 - 1988)

See his full CV up to 2018 here (written in Mandarin).
Other sources: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

• Fei Mingxing, Chinese Ambassador to Samoa

• Cao Xiaolin, Chinese Ambassador to Qatar

• Pang Chunxue, Chinese Ambassador to Albania

• Wang Liang, Chinese Ambassador to Bolivia

All of these countries are strategically important to China, albeit for different reasons. For example, Qatar is an important supplier of LNG, Bolivia has the world’s largest lithium reserves, Samoa is located in a key part of the South Pacific, and Albania is a potential link for China into Europe.

Whilst technically occurring at the end of last year, another recent change to China’s diplomatic network was the arrival of Wang Wengang to Equatorial Guinea on 31 December 2023. China reportedly has had plans to establish a naval base there for years, however nothing has ever been made public.

Even though all of these countries are strategically important to China, none of these posts are senior ambassadorial roles. This is evidenced by the fact that most of the new appointees had not previously held the rank of ambassador. Indeed, the only one with previous ambassadorial experience is Cao Xiaolin, who used to be the Chinese Ambassador to Tonga.

The only appointees with an official CV available online were Fei Mingxing and Wang Wengang. For everyone else, open-source data was used to approximate their career. See the end of this article for more information on each ambassador.

According to the information available, only two of the new ambassadors have experience working in roles related to their current region, namely, Fei Mingxing (Oceania) and Wang Liang (South America).

It is not clear why Pang Chunxue was posted to Europe, given her extensive experience working in South Asia. That being said, the only vacant post in South Asia is the ambassadorial post to India, which is a vice-ministerial-level role and will require a more seasoned ambassador.

Similarly, until his posting to West Africa, Wang Wengang had spent his entire career specialising in European affairs. It would seem, therefore, that Wang would have been a better candidate for the ambassadorial position in Albania. However, some unknown factor may have been the reason he was ultimately not selected for that role.

With the arrival of this new cohort, the number of vacant Chinese ambassadorial posts has fallen to just under a dozen. As it is typical for around a quarter of China’s diplomatic roster to change each year, it is likely that we will also see a number of current ambassadors conclude their posts to make room for new appointments.

Stay tuned for future updates from China Diplomatic Digest.

Fei Mingxing (费明星), Chinese Ambassador to Samoa

Career (past 20 years):
2003 - 2005: First Secretary, Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
2005 - 2006: Consul, Chinese Consulate in Brisbane
2006 - 2010: Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission, Chinese Embassy in Fiji
2010 - 2015: Counselor and Division Director, Consular Department, MFA
2015 - 2018: Counselor | Minister Counselor, Chinese Embassy in the United Kingdom
2018 - 2023: Chinese Consul General in Durban, South Africa
2023: Counselor, Consular Department, MFA
2024 - Present: Chinese Ambassador to Samoa

Education:
Studied English at Southwest Normal University (1984 - 1988)

See his full CV up to 2018 here (written in Mandarin).
Other sources: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Cao Xiaolin (曹小林), Chinese Ambassador to Qatar

Recent Career*:
2011 - 2017: Counselor, Chinese Embassy in Kenya
2017 - 2020: Deputy Director-General, Department of External Security Affairs, MFA
2020 - 2023: Ambassador to Tonga
2024 - Present: Ambassador to Qatar

Sources: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7

Pang Chunxue (庞春雪), Chinese Ambassador to Albania

Recent Career*:
2010 - 2011: First Secretary, Chinese Embassy in the United Kingdom
From 2011 (until at least 2013): Counselor | Deputy Chief of Mission | Chargé d'Affaires, Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan
2016 - 2018: Counselor | Deputy Chief of Mission | Chargé d'Affaires, Chinese Embassy in Sri Lanka
2019 - 2023: Minister Counselor | Minister | Deputy Chief of Mission | Chargé d'Affaires, Chinese Embassy in Pakistan
2024 - Present: Chinese Ambassador to Albania

Sources: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11

Wang Liang (王亮), Chinese Ambassador to Bolivia

Recent Career*:
2015 - 2018: Counselor | Minister Counselor | Chargé d'Affaires, Chinese Embassy in Argentina
2019 - 2023: Director of the General Office | Deputy Director-General, Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, MFA
2024 - Present: Chinese Ambassador to Bolivia

Sources: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7

Wang Wengang (王文刚), Chinese Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea

Recent career*:

2011 - 2015: Counselor, Chinese Embassy in Poland
2015 - 2017: Counselor, Department of European Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2017 - 2019: Deputy Mayor of Zhangzhou Municipal People's Government (temporary post)
2019 - 2023: Chinese Consul General in Florence, Italy
2023 - Present: Chinese Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea

Education:
Studied Polish at the Beijing Foreign Studies University (1986 - 1990)

See his full CV up to 2019 here (written in Mandarin).
Other sources: 1, 2, 3

*Information compiled using open-source data and may be incomplete. Exact dates were also not always available.

Before shifting our attention to 2024, let us take a moment to review some of the most important changes China made to its diplomatic network over the past 12 months. Whilst many of the appointments made during the year were noteworthy, here are five of the most significant changes made (presented in no particular order):

1.     Xie Feng, China’s new Ambassador to the US

One of the most significant changes China made in 2023 was the appointment of Vice Minister Xie Feng (谢锋) to the role of Chinese Ambassador to the US. Whilst Xie did not take up his new post until mid-May, his possible selection was leaked to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in January. It is also his third time being posted to the Chinese Embassy in the US.

The WSJ wrote that Xie “is regarded by both colleagues and foreign counterparts as a firm and evenhanded conduit” between the two countries, and suggested that he was appointed “to dial back [China’s] aggressive diplomacy” in an attempt to help improve the country’s image.

Unlike his predecessor, Qin Gang, Xie is a US expert, having spent most of his career focusing on North American affairs. During his time as Vice Foreign Minister, Xie was in charge of US-China relations.

When Xie took his new office, China’s relationship with the US was at its lowest point in decades. Since his appointment, however, relations between the two countries have gradually improved. For example, in November 2023 President Xi Jinping made his first visit to the US in six years to attend the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in San Fransisco, where he met with US President Joe Biden. Just before the summit, China and the US had also held arms-control talks for the first time in years.

2.     Yu Bo, China’s first-ever Ambassador to Honduras

2023 also saw the appointment of China’s first-ever Ambassador to Honduras, Yu Bo (于波). Originally, Yu had been leading the team sent to set up China’s new embassy, following the establishment of ties between China and Honduras in March 2023. Yu had experience in such matters, having just performed a similar task next door in Nicaragua.

Yu’s position as chargé d'affaires in Honduras was made permanent when he was selected to be the new ambassador. The only two Central American countries still retaining relations with the Republic of China (aka, Taiwan) are Honduras’s neighbours, Belize, and Guatemala. You can find more information about Yu Bo here.

3.     Zhao Xing, the first ambassador to present credentials to the Taliban

When it was announced that Zhao Xing (赵星) had arrived in Afghanistan and had presented his credentials to the Taliban-led government, global media quickly picked up the story. This is because Zhao was the first diplomat to officially present ambassadorial credentials to the Afghan government since the Taliban’s takeover in 2021. This drew a lot of interest because other countries have been opting to use the title ‘chargé d'affaires’ to avoid legitimating the Taliban by having their diplomats present official letters of credence to Taliban leaders.

Whilst the Chinese government still does not officially recognise the Taliban-led government, China is also the first country to accept an ambassador sent by the new government. For more information about Zhao Xing’s appointment, including his background, see this article.

4.     Wu Wei, China’s new Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)

Perhaps the most drama-filled appointment of the year was that of Wu Wei (吴伟), former Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department of External Security Affairs, who was posted to the Federated States of Micronesia. The reason for describing this appointment as dramatic is that Wu Wei’s appointment had been originally rejected due to national security concerns by then-President David Panuelo, who had been openly critical of China’s politicking in the region.

In an interview with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Panuelo recalled:

“I received his curriculum vitae in probably December of 2022, and I was worried that the Department of External Security Affairs is one of China’s Foreign Affairs entities with strong relationships with China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) — that’s their CIA equivalent — and their Ministry of Public Security (MPS) — which is their FBI equivalent. All three work on United Front Work issues, such as secret police stations in Canada, New York, London, and Tokyo.”

According to a letter penned by Panuelo whilst he was still President, the Chinese government did not respond directly to the rejection of Wu Wei. Rather, they signalled to other FSM politicians that China would simply wait for Panuelo’s successor to take office. Soon after Wesley Simina succeeded Panuelo as President of FSM, Wu’s appointment was approved and he arrived to take up his post in June.

5.     Wang Yajun, China’s Ambassador to North Korea

In March 2023, Wang Yajun (王亚军) finally took office as the new Chinese Ambassador to North Korea. Whilst Wang’s selection had been made public in early 2021, he had to wait nearly two years to take up his post, as it wasn’t until 2023 that North Korea made a one-off exception to its COVID policy to allow Wang into the country. By that time, Wang’s predecessor, Li Jinjun, had long since departed Pyongyang, having left in December 2021. This meant that China did not have an ambassador resident in Pyongyang for more than a year.

Prior to Wang’s posting to North Korea, he had been serving as a Vice Minister of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CCP. Unlike other diplomatic relationships, the International Liaison Department plays an important role managing China’s relationship with North Korea. As one of the youngest vice-ministerial-level officials within China’s foreign affairs apparatus, Wang’s future career will be one to watch.

These are but a few examples of the important changes China made to its diplomatic network in 2023.

Analysis of the 2023 cohort also shows that only seven (15.2 per cent) of the ambassadors appointed were women, none of which were vice-ministerial-level appointments. This figure is in-line with the broader situation in Chinese politics. A 2023 UN report expressed concern when it found that women only constituted “35 per cent of diplomats (2023), 11.3 per cent of ambassadors (2022), 32.7 per cent of judges (2017) and 22.3 per cent of members of management teams in public institutions (2017)”.

Writing for MERICS in 2018, Sabine Mokry found that most Chinese ambassadorial posts lasted on average for three and a half years, and that China swaps up to a third of its ambassadors each year. As such, we should expect to see a similar number of ambassadors appointed in 2024 as there were appointed in 2023. This also means that many current Chinese ambassadors will be concluding their posts this year.

At the end of 2023, fifteen ambassadorial posts were still vacant, namely: Albania, Angola, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Eritrea, India, Laos, Madagascar, Qatar, Singapore, Samoa, Syria, Sudan, Tonga, and Yemen.

The first ambassadorial post to be filled in 2024 was Samoa, with Fei Mingxing arriving in Apia to take up his new role on 1 Jan. Whilst most of the remaining posts will be filled this year, it is possible that some may not. For example, China has still not replaced its Ambassador to India, despite the position being made vacant in Oct 2022.

As we head into 2024, it will be important to continue monitoring Chinese diplomatic appointments, as they provide an insight into China’s overarching foreign policy priorities. It will be interesting to see which appointments are made, and the impact each one will have. Make sure to stay subscribed to China Diplomatic Digest to keep up to date with the latest analysis.

EDIT 04/01/2024: Two vacant ambassadorial posts (Yemen and Libya) were accidentally excluded from in the original article, both have since been added.

Unlike his predecessor, Li Ming, who was an expert in Oceanian affairs, Cai has spent most of his career focussed on the Middle East and North Africa. Indeed, prior to his latest appointment, Cai had been serving as Deputy Director-General of the Department of West Asian and North African Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

Whilst details of his career are scarce, publicly available information reveals that Cai has held senior positions at the Chinese Embassy in Israel, including stints as chargé d’affaires ad interim, and at the UN as an Alternate Representative on the Security Council, covering topics such as Sudan/South Sudan, Libya, Syria, and Counter Terrorism.

Chinese diplomats will quite often specialise in - and then focus on - a specific geographic region. It is, therefore, not immediately apparent as to why Cai was selected for this role.

Interestingly, Cai’s predecessor is also currently working out of his comfort zone serving as Chinese Ambassador to Serbia, having spent most of his career focussing on North American and Oceanian affairs.

Cai’s appointment comes not long after the close of the 2023 Pacific Games, which were held in Solomon Islands for the first time. The US and China are currently engaged in a geostrategic competition for influence in the region, and this year’s Pacific Games were no exception.

Since China and Solomon Islands established ties in 2019, the Pacific Games have been a recurring theme in their relationship. Indeed, when the Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, Manasseh Sogavare, first met Li Ming upon his arrival in 2020, he took the opportunity to thank China “for its funding assistance towards the 2023 Pacific games”, saying that “[t]he Pacific Games was something we wanted to host for a very long time. This will be our first opportunity”.

Delivering on its promise, China has helped build seven sports facilities, including but not limited to, a 10,000-seat stadium. The Guardian reported that in total, China spent $119m, all of which was framed as a “gift” from China to Solomon Islands.

Not wanting to be left out of the 2023 Pacific Games, the US confirmed earlier this year that it would send its hospital ship USNS Mercy to provide medical assistance for the duration of the games. NBC Papua New Guinea reported that 3000 patients were treated on-board.

Much to the US’s concern, China and Solomon Islands signed a security pact in 2022, before then upgrading their relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2023.

It is possible that Cai’s experience dealing with issues relating to security and political instability was a deciding factor behind his recent posting. Solomon Islands has had multiple episodes of political instability over the years, with the most recent taking place in 2021, which saw the targeting of ethnically Chinese residents, as well as the looting and torching of businesses in Honiara’s Chinatown.

In response to the riots, MFA Spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated that the “Chinese side is taking all necessary measures to protect the safety and lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens and institutions in Solomon Islands”.

When a draft of the 2022 security pact was posted online, it was not surprising to see the ability for Solomon Islands to request Chinese police and armed forces “to assist in maintaining social order, protecting people’s lives, and property” included in the scope of cooperation.

The draft also allows China to send “relevant forces” for the purposes of “protect[ing] the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands”. The two countries have since signed more agreements relating to policing and law enforcement.

After news of the 2022 security agreement broke, it was speculated that this could lead to China establishing a naval base in the country. Whilst both governments have denied the possibility of this, the draft does state that Chinese vessels would be permitted to “make ship visits to, carry out logistical replenishment in, and have stopover and transition in Solomon Islands”- but only with consent from the host government.

Therefore, when it was reported earlier this year that the China Civil Engineering Construction Company had won a contract to upgrade ports in Honiara, paid for by a loan from the Asian Development Bank, concerns that the international port’s facilities could become “dual purpose” were once again raised.

Chinese companies have won a number of key infrastructure contracts in Solomon Islands in recent years, including a contract to build mobile communication towers –built by China Harbour Engineering Company Limited, supplied by Huawei and paid for by a loan from Exim Bank of China.

In response to China’s growing influence in the country, the US has increased the amount of aid it sends there, and re-opened its embassy in Solomon Islands, after a 30-year absence.

Since his arrival last week, Cai Weiming has already formally presented his letter of credence to Governor-General Sir David Vunagi, had a meeting with the Speaker of the National Parliament of Solomon Islands Patteson Oti, as well as met with Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare.

Cai has also attended a groundbreaking ceremony for a Chinese funded medical centre, and a ceremonial Exchange of Notes on a feasibility study for the tar sealing of the Auki Road Network.

With the ever-increasing cooperation between Solomon Islands and China, Cai will certainly be kept busy. Stability in Solomon Islands is obviously a priority for China, and, as the new ambassador, Cai will have been tasked with ensuring Chinese interests are protected from any further local unrest.

Spajić leads the Europe Now Movement and formed his government with members from both pro-EU and pro-Serbia / Russia parties in Montenegro.

What will China’s relations with Montenegro’s new government look like?

Spajić has already stated that two of his foreign policy priorities are full membership of the European Union (EU) and an active membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Montenegro submitted its application for the EU in 2008, and joined NATO in 2017.

Just days after taking office, Spajić met with US Ambassador Judy Rising Reinke, where he said that "[t]he Government of Montenegro is completely pro-Euro-Atlantic, and the United States of America is our key partner and ally".

Therefore, it will be difficult for China to convince Spajić’s government to pursue any policies that may jeopardise Montenegro’s relationship with the US, NATO or the EU. Spajić is also likely more familiar with China than his predecessors, having lived in Asia for many years, studied for a semester at China’s prestigious Tsinghua University and passed the HSK 5 (upper intermediate) Mandarin language proficiency exam in 2011.

For China, Montenegro is important for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as it has plans to have the country act as a link into Europe via the - partially completed, controversial, and costly - Bar-Boljare highway.

The project will eventually connect Montenegro’s port on the Adriatic coast with Serbia, providing the country a connection to the Trans-European Transport Network through Pan-European Corridor X, linking “ports on the Adriatic Sea to those on the Danube”.

Montenegro’s participation in the BRI has likely become even more critical following Italy’s decision to withdraw from the initiative. Montenegro officially joined the BRI in 2017.

In recent years, there have been concerns that China’s influence has grown in Montenegro, due to debt owed to Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank) for help financing the first phase of the Bar-Boljare Motorway through a €687 million in 2014 loan.

The first section, which was finally opened in 2022 after many delays, is a 41-kilometer road between Smokovac and Mateševo built by the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), which reportedly has “20 bridges on the main route, two overpasses, eight underpasses, 7,2 kilometers of concrete walls, and 16 double-tube tunnels”. Montenegro’s terrain made this section of the road complex to design and expensive to build.

After beginning the project, unfavourable currency volatility with no hedge, alleged local corruption, and issues with the original plans led to costs spiralling out of control, with one official later estimating that the true cost of the first phase might have been as high as €1.2b. These extra costs are not owed to China Exim Bank, however.

That being said, as of 30 Sept 2023, Montenegro’s debt stock owed to the bank was valued at €711m, 17.85% of total central government debt.

The project has been cited as an example of China’s so-called “debt-trap diplomacy”, due to the incredible burden the loan has put on Montenegro’s finances. A 2018 report released by the Center for Global Development listed Montenegro as one of eight countries with high risk of debt distress that could be exacerbated by future BRI loans.

NPR reported that not only does the loan contract allow for China Exim Bank to seize land in Montenegro should the government fail to repay the loan, but also that Chinese courts would have the final say on the contract’s execution.

Reuters reported in 2018 that the IMF had estimated that it would cost another $1.2b to complete the rest of the Bar-Boljare Motorway and that the then-Prime Minister Dusko Markovic had said that it will be finished at any cost.

It is unlikely that Spajić will seek to complete the project “at any cost”, especially if that means similar loans from China Exim Bank or other Chinese banks. Indeed, it was during Spajić’s time as Finance Minister that Montenegro formally sought help with its debt to China from the EU. He also once called the first section of the project “the most expensive highway in the world”.

Eventually, Spajić was able to help secure a currency hedging deal with Societe Generale, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs, which was said to have “reduced the interest rate on debt to China’s Exim Bank from 2% in dollars to 0.88% in euros”. The deal didn’t last, however, as Spajic’s successor at the Ministry of Finance, Aleksandar Damjanović, decided to exit Montenegro from the hedging deal earlier this year.

Nevertheless, Spajić will likely be very hesitant to expose Montenegro to more Chinese debt, especially since he worked for several years as a Distressed Credit Research Analyst while at Goldman Sachs in Singapore. He certainly will be aware that debt distress will hinder Montenegro’s EU ascension process, which Spajić wants to speed up.

Regardless of these conditions, Chinese Ambassador Fan Kun has not wasted time seeking out members of Spajić’s government to promote relations with China.

As of 11 Dec, Fan has met with thirteen of Spajić’s Ministers and Deputy Prime Ministers, as well as the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the President and two Vice Presidents of the Montenegrin Parliament, as well as Spajić himself. Fan used these meetings to advocate for closer China-Montenegro relations.

Interestingly, Fan’s first meeting was on 7 Nov with the newly appointed President of the Montenegrin Parliament, Andrija Mandić, who is a leader of the pro-Russian political alliance Democratic Front. Whilst this was likely not intentional, it is possible Fan believes Mandić will be his closest ally moving forward.

On 4 Dec, Fan Kun also published an article in Radio and Television of Montenegro, the country’s public service broadcaster, titled “New opportunities for cooperation between China and Montenegro”, where he stated that

Clearly, China is not discouraged by Spajić’s pro-Euro-Atlantic policy platform.

Whilst it is unlikely that China will be able to expand its influence in Montenegro under the new government, it is likely that China will be able to maintain its involvement with Montenegrin infrastructure projects.

Indeed, earlier this year, a Memorandum of Understanding between Montenegro and a Chinese consortium was signed for the construction of a €54m highway connecting Budva and Tivat on Montenegro’s coast.

In addition, the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) has expressed an interest in building the second and third stretches of the Bar-Boljare Motorway. Whilst funding for the further phases of the project have not yet been secured, options include grants and loans from European institutions - which the Ministry of Capital Investments had been negotiating before the election - or a private-public partnership model, as the CRBC suggested.

It will be interesting to see how China-Montenegro relations develop moving forward, and whether Montenegro will be able to secure more funding from European and American banks, thus avoiding the need to seek out more Chinese loans in pursuit of economic development.

For some context, from COP1 to COP17, the typical size of China's delegation trended upwards. However, from COP18 onwards, the number of Chinese delegates attending the conference began to slowly decrease. The only times that this trend was not followed was at COP15 in Copenhagen and at COP21 in Paris, where the size of China's delegation spiked noticeably. Expectations were high for both COP15 and COP21, and whilst the former failed to produce anything of substance, the latter culminated with the signing of the Paris Agreement.

As the world’s largest producer of greenhouse gases and a leading investor in renewables, it is important to track China’s engagement with COP.

In another sign that China is placing more political importance on COP28 is the presence of First Vice-Premier and Politburo Standing Committee Member Ding Xuexiang, the most senior Chinese government and party official to attend COP since Paris 2015.

Whilst, in comparison, China’s COP28 delegation is only the 34th largest by size, the relative increase from last year shows that China is indeed more engaged this year. This year’s COP is also the first since the lifting of China’s ‘zero covid’ policy, which will have had an impact on the previous two years’ attendance levels, however as the above graph shows, China’s attendance was low before the pandemic.

Attendance is higher across the board this year, with over 24,000 registered official participants (there are also approximately 27,000 ‘overflow’ participants registered that are not part of an official country delegation). To put these numbers into perspective, the previous record holder, COP21, ‘only’ had 19,201 official delegates in attendance.

Li Shuo, incoming Director of the China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute, suggests that whilst foreign policy shifts and domestic developments may result in Chinese negotiators taking “a more combative tone on sensitive issues such as fossil fuel phaseout”, China’s sense of accountability “to both domestic and global stakeholders” and concern for how it is perceived by the Global South may help push China to join in consensus.

Looking at the breakdown of China’s official delegation, it is unsurprising to see that China’s foreign affairs and environmental organisations are the most represented. An important change from previous years, however, is the size of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) cohort. Indeed, since the ministry took the lead on tackling China’s climate change issues after its creation in 2018, very few people registered as MEE staff have attended COP. This year, however, MEE staff make up 12% of the total delegation.

Leading China’s delegation this year is Zhao Yingmin, Vice Minister of the MEE, who took over from Xie Zhenhua as head of the delegation in 2019. Serving as deputy head is Xia Yingxian, Director of the MEE’s Department of Climate Change.

Xie Zhenhua is back once again this year as China’s Special Envoy for Climate Change Affairs. Xie has been an important and consistent figure behind China’s engagement on climate change issues, and led the Chinese delegation at COP from 2007 to 2018.

Serving as Xie’s Senior Advisor is Liu Zhenmin, a former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs who is rumoured to be the next Special Envoy for Climate Change once Xie retires.

Please see below for more information on the above-mentioned delegates.

In short, China’s re-engagement with COP post-pandemic has seen an increase in Chinese delegates at COP, and amongst them are some of China’s most experienced negotiators. Whilst the final outcome of COP28 is not yet known, it is clear that China is taking this year’s negotiations more seriously.

One element of China’s maritime diplomacy not discussed in detail, however, was the so-called ‘Harmonious Missions’ conducted by the PLA Navy’s 300-bed hospital ship Daishan Dao (岱山岛), also known as Peace Ark (和平方舟) during peacetime.

Since 2010, Peace Ark has successfully completed nine Harmonious Missions, totalling over 250 days moored in the ports of more than forty countries, primarily to provide free medical services, from outpatient visits and physical examinations to surgical treatment, CT scans, ECG scans, lab tests, and more.

The diplomatic significance of the Harmonious Missions should not go underestimated. The provision of free medical services is an effective way of cultivating a positive public image. It can also help improve bilateral relations with the host government. In addition, because hospital ships are non-combat vessels, Peace Ark’s visits are non-threatening and may be more favourably received by some countries.

Initially, the geographic reach of Peace Ark’s Harmonious Missions were limited to one area, such as the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, or the Caribbean. For example, for Harmonious Mission-2010, Peace Ark visited Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Bangladesh, all of which are accessible from the Indian Ocean.

As time went on, however, the missions became more ambitious. For example, Harmonious Mission-2017 saw Peace Ark depart from Zhoushan in China, travel to Djibouti via Sri Lanka, circumnavigate the continent of Africa, cross the Indian Ocean to East Timor before returning to China.

The mission had eight official port calls for the purposes of providing medical services, with two replenishment stops in Sri Lanka and Spain (medical services were still provided in Sri Lanka1). According to analysis of the mission, an average of more than 1000 patients were received onboard every day2.

Whilst most countries have been visited by Peace Ark just one time, there are some countries that have been visited multiple times, such as Indonesia, Vanuatu, and Tonga, who have all been visited three times each.

China is not the only country that uses its hospital ships on goodwill missions. For example, the US sends its hospital ships USNS Mercy and Comfort on missions as part of the ‘Pacific Partnership’ and ‘Continuing Promise’ missions, which began in 20063 and 2007 respectively4 .

Unlike the Pacific Partnership, which focuses solely on regions around the Indo-Pacific, and Continuing Promise, which focuses on Latin America, Peace Ark’s Harmonious Missions are not conducted within a specific region. This makes it easier to speculate the possible political motivation for each mission by assessing the choice of destination.

For example, in 2023, Peace Ark journeyed to the South Pacific for its first multi-stop Harmonious Mission since 2018. For eight weeks between July and August, Peace Ark toured the Pacific Islands visiting Kiribati, Tonga, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands, before heading to East Timor as its final stop. Whilst the mission only had five scheduled stops, it was clear that the mission had political significance.

Observers were quick to point out that Kiribati and the Solomon Islands both cut ties with Taiwan in 2019 in favour of China5. The Solomon Islands have also begun cooperating with China on security issues, with the two countries signing an agreement in 2022.

Zongyuan Zoe Liu, writing for the Council on Foreign Relations, suggested that this could open the door for a Chinese naval base there, however, plans for a Chinese base have been denied by both governments6.

According to Euan Graham at the International Institute for Security Studies, “[t]he primary driver behind the agreement is China’s long-term strategy of displacing the United States as the predominant power in the Western Pacific”7.

It is not as if the US is entirely absent from the region, however. Indeed, Pacific Partnership 2023 from August to November this year saw the USS Pearl Harbor (a Harpers Fairy-class dock landing ship) and USS Jackson with (an Independence-Class littoral combat ship) make port calls in Vietnam, the Philippines, Samoa, Malaysia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga8.

In addition to this, USNS Mercy - one of the US’s hospital ships - is also currently in the South Pacific for the Pacific Partnership 2024-1. The vessel has already visited the Marshall Islands and Solomon Islands, and it will soon head to Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia9.

Dr Eileen Natuzzi from Georgetown University’s centre for Australia, New Zealand and Pacific studies argues that “[b]oth the Peace Ark and Mercy hospital ship programs add new levels of escalating tension between the United States and China – military medical mission competition”10.

Natuzzi also points out that a “large white hulled ship arriving off the coast of a Pacific Island country is big public relations”, which helps explain why both the US and China choose to conduct these missions.

With the return of China’s Harmonious Missions in the post-covid era, it will be interesting to see where China decides to visit next. It is possible that next year Peace Ark will visit the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam in an attempt to foster goodwill in the South China Sea.

Alternatively, Peace Ark may organise a tour of Central America to visit Honduras as a gesture of goodwill, following the country’s decision in 2023 to cut relations with Taiwan and establish relations with China.

Regardless of where Peace Ark journeys to next, its chosen destination will likely have significance for China’s diplomatic ambitions.

References

Note: sources for the Harmonious Mission destinations will be added to the web version of this article.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has conducted at least 22 goodwill visits to different countries around the world so far this year, from Southeast Asia to the Persian Gulf and West Africa. These visits are an important part of China’s diplomatic machinery.

International Relations scholar Ken Booth defined naval goodwill visits as “a specific attempt to cultivate the host country, with the hope of accumulating diplomatic capital”1. The content of goodwill visits varies, but can consist of welcome receptions, ship tours, cultural performances, and more. China’s goodwill visits also often coincide with joint naval exercises.

For nearly 40 years, China has been sending its navy on goodwill visits, beginning in 1985, when China sent a destroyer and supply ship to visit Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh2. In 1997, Chinese destroyer Harbin (112) made history as the first ever Chinese naval ship to visit the US mainland3. Chinese destroyer Shenzhen (167) made China’s first ever goodwill visit to Africa in 20004 and, in 2001, China’s first ever goodwill visit to Europe5.

Since then, the frequency of goodwill naval visits has increased, thanks partly to the anti-piracy taskforce China has sustained in and around the Gulf of Aden since 20086, meaning that the PLA Navy now transits Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean on a regular basis, supported by China’s base in Djibouti (in fact, China has been using Djibouti as a location for replenishment and repair since 20107, a full 7 years before its base was officially launched).

So far in 2023, China’s PLA Navy has successfully completed five separate goodwill tours, three in Southeast Asia, one in the Persian Gulf and one on the west coast of Africa. Two of these tours were conducted by China’s anti-piracy escort taskforces, the other two were conducted by the training ship Qi Jiguang.

• In May and June, Qi Jiguang paid good will visits to Vietnam8, Thailand9, Brunei10, and the Philippines11.

• In June and July, the 43rd Escort Taskforce paid goodwill visits to Côte d'Ivoire12, Ghana13, Nigeria14, Gabon15, and the Republic of Congo16.

• From July to Sept, Chinese hospital ship Daishan Dao visited Kiribati17, Tonga18, Vanuatu19, the Solomon Islands20, and East Timor21 for its Harmonious-2023 mission.

• In Sept and Oct, Qi Jiguang headed from Qingdao to Indonesia22, then to Papua New Guinea23, and Fiji24.

• Finally, from Oct to November, the 44th Escort Taskforce spent time touring the Persian Gulf, visiting Oman25, Kuwait26, Qatar27, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)28.

In addition to these tours, at the conclusion of this year’s Chinese-Russian joint naval exercises “Northern Joint-2023”, Chinese vessels also paid a goodwill visit to Vladivostok, however as this visit was not part of a goodwill tour, it was not included on the above map29.

In addition to the tours conducted by the training ship Qi Jiguang and the 43rd and 44th Escort Taskforces, China’s hospital ship regularly conducts what China calls “Harmonious Missions”. This year’s Harmonious Mission toured Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. A full analysis of China’s Hamonious Missions will be provided in a follow-up article.

The PLA Navy likely has multiple reasons for conducting goodwill visits, taking into consideration both soft and hard power.

First, these visits are good for public diplomacy. Cultural exchanges, ship tours, and other light-hearted public events are effective public diplomacy tools which can help improve China’s image locally.

Second, goodwill visits help develop or reaffirm bilateral relations. By using the visit to meet with local military and political leaders, China’s PLA Navy is able to better acquaint themselves with local elites. China’s goodwill visits often also coincide with joint naval exercises with the host nation, which help further develop friendly bilateral relations.

Third, goodwill visits help build China’s image as a maritime power. When China first began conducting goodwill naval visits, the PLA Navy was considered to be a coastal navy. Indeed, in 2001, Dr Probal Ghosh, a retired captain from the Indian Navy who then became a scholar specialising in maritime security, wrote that

“a recently publicised goodwill visit of a Chinese Song class submarine and accompanying warships to Indian Ocean ports had some regional navies in a tizzy. Perhaps the underlying message of the visit, seemingly, was that the Chinese were trying to show their 'presence' in the ocean and were saying that they had enough capability to roam the Indian Ocean freely. For the Chinese, it was an upbeat moment since their navy is perceived to be a coastal one”30.

Over the years, China’s goodwill visits have provided the PLA Navy with ample opportunity to demonstrate the progress it has made in modernisation.

In addition to the above reasons, this year’s goodwill visits may have had another motive: namely, China’s on-going search for new naval bases. For example, this year’s visits to the UAE and Gabon may have been used to give Chinese navy vessels an excuse to visit locations that are said to be potential PLA Naval bases31.

Earlier this year, it was reported by the Washington Post that build-up had resumed at a suspected Chinese military site in the UAE, starting in December 202232. The project had supposedly been halted after the US expressed its concerns about the project with the UAE in late 202133, however, a leaked report obtained by the Washington Post indicated that construction had since resumed.

A goodwill visit from the PLA Navy would have been useful cover for any vessels wishing to visit the site. This visit was the PLA Navy’s sixth visit to the UAE34, starting with a goodwill visit in 201035.

The same Washington Post article named Gabon as another potential location for a PLA Navy base. In 2023, it certainly appeared that a base was on the cards, with China-Gabon relations developing rapidly.

• In January, then-Foreign Minister Qin Gang visited Gabon36.

• In April, President Bongo visited China and met with President Xi Jinping, where they elevated their bilateral relations from a “comprehensive cooperative partnership” to a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership”37

• In June, the Commander of the PLA Navy, Admiral Dong Jun, visited Gabon where he met with President Ali Bongo. Reports suggest they had a constructive discussion that “laid the foundations for enhanced cooperation in key sectors such as defence, maritime security and capacity building”38.

• In July, whilst Gabon’s Foreign Minister was in Beijing attending a forum and meeting bilaterally with Foreign Minister Wang Yi39, the 43^rd Escort Taskforce paid a goodwill visit to Gabon, which lasted 4 days40.

After Bongo’s deposition on 30 August, Africa Intelligence reported that Beijing had indeed secured a deal with Gabon, however the coup d'état had put the deal on hold41. It is not yet known what the fate of the agreement is, however, China’s Ambassador to Gabon has been very proactive in establishing good relations with the transitional government (see more information here).

In conclusion, PLA Navy goodwill visits are an important part of China’s diplomatic machinery. These visits help China improve its public image, develop bilateral relationships, and demonstrate the PLA Navy’s ability to reach the far corners of the ocean. In addition, this year’s set of goodwill tours have demonstrated that these visits can provide convenient cover for any PLA Navy vessel that may wish to visit potential base locations.

References

When US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated at the Arms Control Association’s Annual Forum in June 2023 that the US is now “ready to engage China without preconditions”1, China’s initial reaction - as reported by Semafor - was that “China’s nuclear strength is far from being on par with the U.S. and Russia. The time is not ready yet for [Beijing] to join the nuclear arms control negotiations proposed by some”2. Evidently, China’s position has softened slightly since then.

The US described Monday's talks as "constructive", however, an unnamed US official speaking with Reuters said that the meeting was not "substantive”, and that no new information was revealed3.

According to a press release from the US State Department, US officials emphasised the importance of increased PRC nuclear transparency and engagement on measures to manage strategic risks, as well as the need to promote stability, to avoid an unconstrained arms race, and to manage competition as to prevent direct conflict4. Indeed, the US Government has become increasingly concerned about China’s rapidly growing nuclear arsenal and the lack of transparency surrounding it5.

The unnamed US official also stated that there was no indication the Chinese government is willing to separate arms control and strategic stability from disagreements on other issues.

The two sides exchanged views on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, cooperation among the five nuclear-weapon states, nuclear security, non-proliferation and export control, biological and chemical treaty compliance, outer space security and conventional arms control6.

Whilst no follow-up meeting has been announced, it is possible that one will be agreed during President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden’s scheduled meeting on 15 Nov during the 30th APEC Economic Leaders’ Week due to be held in San Francisco.

As Director-General of the Department of Arms Control, it is likely that Sun Xiaobo will continue to play a leading role in any future arms control talks with the US. Therefore, it will be important to know more about him.

Sun Xiaobo is an expert on international multilateral politics, having spent most of his career either at the UN in New York or at the Department of International Organizations and Conferences within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Whilst at the UN, Sun accumulated plenty of experience dealing with different international issues, however, his appointment as the Director-General of the Department of Arms Control appears to be his first official role focussing specifically on arms control.

Since his appointment nearly 12 months ago, Sun has held conversations on a variety of related matters face-to-face or via telephone with representatives from the Netherlands, Germany, the EU, Iran, the UN, Pakistan, the UK, and now the US.

When speaking with Enrique Mora, the EU’s Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service, Sun stated the China would continue to support the EU’s on-going efforts relating to the Iran nuclear deal and called on all relevant parties to resume negotiations7.

An official version of Sun’s CV is not available, however, it was possible to approximate his career since 2001 using open-source information. China Diplomatic Digest cannot guarantee that the below CV is 100% accurate, however, best efforts were made and sources have been provided.

Sun Xiaobo’s CV (unofficial):

20018 – 20069 Third Secretary | Adviser, China’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations

200710 – 200911 Deputy Director, UN Division, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, MFA

2009 – 2014 Counsellor12 | First Secretary13 | Alternate Representative at Security Council14 | Adviser15, China’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations

2014 – 2020 Deputy Director-General16 | Counsellor17 | Director18, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, MFA

2016  Member of the Chinese military working group19

201920 – 202221 Deputy Director, Tibetan Foreign Affairs Office

2022.1222 –  Director-General, Department of Arms Control, MFA

**Newspapers are currently reporting contradicting information about the last time China held arms control talks with the US. Some sources, such as the Wall Street Journal, are reporting that the last time such talks were held was during the Obama Administration23, however, the South China Morning Post is reporting that the last meeting was in 201924, when former Director-General Fu Cong met with the Assistant Secretary Christopher Ford in China to discuss nuclear non-proliferation.25

References

Zhai Jun (翟隽) is a senior diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has a wealth of experience dealing with the Middle East. At 68 years old, he is nearing the end of his diplomatic career and has held multiple vice-ministerial-level roles, such as Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (2009 – 2014) and China’s Ambassador to France (2014 – 2019).

Whilst Zhai’s experience is not limited to the Middle East, most of his career has been spent working in related roles. Zhai is also fluent in Arabic (for an example of his linguistic skills, see this video of Zhai in an interview with Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat). He is a graduate from Beijing Foreign Languages ​​School and was sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study Arabic at Cairo University.

Early in his career, Zhai held diplomatic posts in Yemen (Attaché and Third Secretary), Saudi Arabia (First Secretary and Counselor), and Libya (Ambassador). When he was appointed Ambassador to Libya in 1997, 43-year-old Zhai became the youngest ever diplomat to reach such a level of seniority1 , indicating that he showed potential as a diplomat early on.

In between these postings, Zhai worked in the Department of West Asian and North African Affairs. He started as a Third Secretary in 1985 and finished as Director-General of the Department from 2003 to 2006.

In 2006, Zhai was promoted to Assistant Foreign Minister and later to Vice Foreign Minister from 2009 to 2014. During this time, Zhai managed regional affairs in the Middle East and Africa. Whilst working as Assistant Foreign Minister, Zhai also briefly acted as the Chinese Government’s Special Representative to Sudan, where he helped convince the Sudanese government to accept a joint United Nations - African Union peacekeeping plan2 3 4.

In 2019, Zhai became the first vice-ministerial-level official to be appointed Special Envoy on the Middle East Issue since the first envoy with this portfolio was appointed in 20025, suggesting that Middle Eastern issues were gaining prominence on China’s foreign policy agenda. 

One of earliest examples of Zhai speaking about China’s Israel-Palestine policy was in 2006, when he made headlines defending China’s controversial decision to invite Mahmoud al-Zahar, a senior Hamas member who had recently been sworn in as Palestinian Foreign Minister, to a ministerial meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum held in China.

Initially, Chinese officials denied having any intention in inviting al-Zahar to China6, however Zhai later confirmed that al-Zahar would indeed be attending the summit. In response7, Israel summoned China’s Ambassador to lodge a serious protest against the invitation8. 

Zhai justified the Chinese Government’s actions saying that “we don’t necessarily agree with Hamas policies, but we respect the people's choice”. He continued by suggesting that “[o]n this basis, we can urge the Hamas government to respect agreements previously signed with Israel, to recognize Israel and to return to talks"9.

Since 2006, Hamas has repeatedly failed to adhere to ceasefire agreements and still does not recognise Israel.

Nevertheless, in response to the escalation of violence in October 2023, Zhai has repeatedly called for a ceasefire and has argued that only with a cessation of violence will a political solution be reached10.

During his recent trip to the Middle East, Zhai visited 5 different Arab states and attended the Cairo Peace Summit on 21 Oct (where he also met with the Secretary-General of the Arab League on the side-lines).

Analysts such as Raffaello Pantucci argue that Zhai’s tour of the Middle East was nothing but a “listening tour” around the region in an attempt to emulate what China thinks great powers should do during a major conflict11. Another possible explanation could be that Zhai was laying the groundwork for China’s future coordination with the Arab League on the issue.

Indeed, just days prior to his trip, Zhai met with representatives from Arab countries, together with the head of the Arab League office in China12. At the meeting, Zhai said that China supports the Arab League assuming an important role in resolving the Israel-Palestine issue, and that China would “maintain communication and coordination” moving forward.

Zhai has also made contact with representatives from Israel and Palestine. On 12 Oct, he held a phone conversation with Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Deputy Director General in charge of the Asia-Pacific13, and on 17 Oct, Zhai held a face-to-face meeting with Israel’s Ambassador to China14. He also spoke with Palestine’s First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs via a telephone call on 11 Oct15.

If it is China’s intention to work in concert with Arab states in pursuit of a ceasefire, either regionally or at the UN, Zhai’s long-standing relationship with Arab countries and fluency in Arabic would certainly enable him to play a key role. Zhai’s CV can be found below.

Update: this article has had some minor edits for the sake of added clarity

Zhai Jun’s Diplomatic CV16

Born in Hebei Province, December 1954

1972 - 1975 Studied at Beijing Foreign Languages ​​School, sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study in the Arabic Department of the Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, Egypt17

1975 - 1980 Staff member, Department of Translation and Interpretation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

1980 - 1985 Attaché, Third Secretary, Chinese Embassy in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

1985 - 1992 Third Secretary, Deputy Office Director, First Secretary, Department of West Asian and North African Affairs, MFA

1992 - 1996 First Secretary, Counselor, Chinese Embassy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

1996 - 1997 Counselor, Department of West Asian and North African Affairs, MFA

1997 - 2000 Ambassador to Syria

2000  Deputy Director-General, Department of West Asian and North African Affairs, MFA

2000 - 2001 Member of the Standing Committee of Communist Party of China Zhenjiang Municipal Committee, Jiangsu Province

2001 - 2003 Director-General, Bureau for Chinese Diplomatic Missions Abroad, MFA

2003 - 2006 Director-General, Department of West Asian and North African Affairs, MFA

2006 - 2009 Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs

2009 - 2014 Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of regional affairs in West Asia, North Africa and Africa18

2014 - 2019 Ambassador to France and Monaco19 20

2019 - Special Envoy of the Chinese Government on the Middle East Issue

Basra is the economic capital of Iraq, with the surrounding area producing the vast majority of Iraq’s oil. The city is also situated near Iraq’s coast, close to the port city Umm Qasr and the Grand Faw Port, which is currently under construction. The opening of a consulate in Basra is a reflection of the strategic significance of southern Iraq to China.

According to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, consulates perform a variety of different functions, including (but not limited to): protecting the sending state’s interests, assisting its citizens and enterprises, furthering the development of bilateral relations, issuing passports, and acting as a notary1 .

In many countries, China’s consulates are primarily situated to provide practical assistance to Chinese citizens working or studying abroad. For example, there are over half a million people from China currently residing in Australia2. It is not surprising, therefore, that China has a consulate in nearly every state capital in the country.

Other consulates are positioned in areas of strategic importance to ensure that China’s interests are protected through the cultivation of relationships with local elites. These consulates are primarily concerned with promoting and protecting Chinese political, commercial, and security interests.

China’s primary interests in southern Iraq relate to oil. Indeed, Iraq has in recent years been one of the main beneficiaries of BRI-related finance and investment directed at fossil fuel projects3. Basra Province reportedly produces 70 percent of Iraq’s oil4, most of which is exported via the Persian Gulf. According to data reported to UN Comtrade, Iraq is the third largest supplier of crude oil to China, behind only Saudi Arabia and Russia5.

Over the past 10 years, once again according to data reported to UN Comtrade, the amount of crude oil sent from Iraq to China has more than doubled in volume. Only exports to India have kept pace. Currently, China and India account for the majority of Iraq’s crude oil exports.

Data: UN Comtrade, HS code 2709 “Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals; crude”; Graphic: China Diplomatic Digest

Chinese companies have also become increasingly important to Iraq’s oil sector. According to Iraq Oil Report, “[m]ore than half of Iraq's oil production comes from fields where Chinese companies are operators or non-operating partners”6.

In 2019, China and Iraq struck an “oil for construction” deal, with Iraq agreeing to supply 100,000 barrels a day as payment for construction projects7, like the Nasiriyah International Airport8. With many other infrastructure projects currently planned or under construction, an increasing amount of Chinese construction companies and engineering firms have begun operating in southern Iraq.

Basra is also at the centre of two major infrastructure projects: the Grand Faw Port and the Türkiye-Iraq Development Road Project.

The Grand Faw Port is a major port currently under construction on Iraq’s southern coast. Once fully complete, it will be the largest port in the Middle East9. The project has been projected to cost $7bn and is intended to make Iraq a transit hub linking Europe and Asia, largely thanks to the planned Türkiye-Iraq Development Road10.

The so-called Development Road is a mega project that will link Iraq’s Grand Faw Port with neighbouring Türkiye via 1200km worth of rail and road infrastructure. It has been projected that the project will cost up to $17bn11. Iraq has indicated an interest in making the project part of the Belt and Road Initiative and hopes that China will help fund the project12.

In addition to these mega projects, it has recently been announced that a long planned 32km railway line between Basra and the Iranian border town of Shalamcheh has begun construction13. The significance of this railway should not go understated as it will be the only cross-border railway between Iran and Iraq, thus facilitating regional trade and linking Basra into existing Belt and Road lines through Iran14.

These infrastructure projects are set to transform Basra into a regional trade hub, making it a major trade link between Asia and Europe and a key location for the Belt and Road Initiative. With the opening of this consulate, China is both well-positioned to take full advantage of Basra’s growing importance.

Map of Iraq showing which governorates are covered by China’s Consulate-General in Basra

Original image: GAZIANTEP2012 via Wikimedia Commons CC0 1.0. Recolouring and other edits: China Diplomatic Digest

On 16 October 2023, China’s Consulate-General in Basra was officially opened. It will be responsible for the following governates: Al-Najaf, Al-Qadisiyah, Al-Muthana, Al-Basrah, Dhi Qar, and Maysan15. No Consul General has been appointed just yet, however an announcement should be made in the coming months.

The advantage of opening a consulate in Basra is that China’s diplomats will be able to more effectively foster relationships with local government and other stakeholders, ensuring that Chinese interests in the region are well-represented. In addition, with the growing number of Chinese enterprises operating in southern Iraq, the consulate in Basra will be able to ensure that these companies have the support that they need to operate effectively.

China is helped by the fact that political conditions in Iraq are currently fairly favourable, with China receiving support from Iraqi politicians and grassroot activists. Iraq’s current Prime Minister, Muhammad Shia al-Sudani, has been much more enthusiastic about embracing ties with China16 than his predecessor, whose administration had been wary of China’s growing influence17 in Iraq’s energy sector.

In addition to this, a pro-Belt and Road non-partisan parliamentary group of 100 Iraqi MPs was formed earlier this year with the goal of advocating for a "strategic comprehensive cooperation agreement" with China18. On the grassroots level, China has also received support from a group known as the “Popular Movement for the Silk Road”, which has been holding rallies in support of closer relations with China19.

It is therefore highly likely that China will seek to capitalise on this political momentum and expand on its presence in Iraq through more BRI-related projects. In order to make full use of its new consulate in Basra, however, China will need to first appoint an effective Consul General with experience working in the region and do so without delay.

References

The first to arrive on 4 Oct was the UK’s High Commissioner1, next was the Chinese Ambassador2, the Indian High Commissioner3, and the UAE Ambassador4.

In the week that followed, Muizzu met with country representatives from Bangladesh, Japan, Pakistan5, Saudi Arabia6, Sri Lanka7, Australia8, and finally, the US on 12 Oct9. Within two weeks of the election, every diplomat currently residing in the Maldives personally congratulated the President-elect. The rate of which these meetings took place appears to be unprecedented.

For some of these diplomats, this was not their first encounter with Muizzu. This is because prior to his election as President, Muizzu had been serving as the Mayor of Malé, the country’s capital, where he would occasionally meet with the diplomats residing in the city. For example, Chinese Ambassador Wang Lixin met with him on at least four separate occasions 10 11 12 13.

Increased diplomatic presence in the Maldives

This is, without a doubt, the most diplomatic jostling a Maldivian President-elect has experienced following an election.

Despite being an island nation with a population of approximately five-hundred thousand, the Maldives has found itself in the middle of a geopolitical rivalry between China and India. This is due to the country’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean, most critically, because of its proximity to several major shipping lanes14.

Historically, the Maldives has fallen within India’s sphere of influence, with the two countries enjoying close relations for many years. Indeed, prior to China opening its embassy in 2011, the only countries with representation in the Maldives were those from the surrounding region, namely, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.

Since 2011, Saudi Arabia (2015), Japan (2016), the UAE (2019), the UK (2019), Australia (2023), and the US (2023) all opened embassies. Most notably, every member of the so-called ‘Quad’ now has a representative in the Maldives.

The Quad, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, is an informal security dialogue between India, Japan, Australia, and the US that was re-formed in 2017 for the purpose of maintaining a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, however most see it as a response to China’s growing influence in the region.

This year’s election drew a lot of international attention because, from a foreign policy perspective, it was seen as a race between a “pro-India” and a “pro-China” candidate.

The pro-India candidate was President Solih, who would have been Quad’s preferred winner. This is because of his “India First” foreign policy that prioritised relations with India, and his government’s proactive engagement with Quad members on maritime security initiatives.

Muizzu was seen as the “pro-China” candidate because of his role in helping facilitate large Chinese infrastructure projects during his time as Minister of Housing and Infrastructure under President Yameen (2013 – 2018). He has also kept up his China-friendly rhetoric since then.

So whilst countries such as India, Japan, Australia, the US, as well as the UK, were likely disappointed that President Solih did not secure a second term, their representatives in the Maldives would have still wanted to seek out Muizzu to advocate for a continuance of Solih-era foreign policies.

What does a Muizzu presidency mean for China?

The consensus is that Muizzu’s election will be a setback for India and a win for China. Whilst insisting that he is pro-Maldives - not anti-India, nor pro-China15 - Muizzu has indicated that the return of the Progressive Party of Maldives to government would “script a further chapter of strong ties between [the] two countries, both domestically and internationally”16.

It is, therefore, likely that Muizzu will choose to ratify the China-Maldives Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that was signed in late 2017 but never implemented. The Solih administration, after coming into power in 2018, refused to change the necessary laws because of the unbalanced nature of such an agreement17. Ambassador Wang Lixin has not forgotten about the FTA, however, and has publicly advocated for it on multiple occasions 18 19 20 21.

Mimrah Abdul Ghafoor, writing for the Observer Research Foundation, suggests that whilst it may seem puzzling as to why China would want an FTA with such a small economy, the reason China wants the deal is because it would increase its commercial influence over the Maldives22.

During his campaign, Muizzu also promised to remove all foreign military personnel from the Maldives23. Such a move would greatly benefit China, as it would reduce the presence of potentially unfriendly naval forces in the region. This is because, if a conflict were to breakout, a blockade in the region would cut China off from energy imports from the Gulf.

Solih’s administration had been increasing the country’s engagement with Quad countries on maritime security, including signing a framework for a defense and security relationship with the US in 202024, and a deal with India “to develop, support and maintain a Maldives National Defence Force Coast Guard Harbour” in 202125. Muizzu’s rise to power could see the Maldives reducing its cooperation with the US and India on these issues.

In short, Muizzu’s victory will likely mean strengthened ties with China, FTA ratification, and a scale back of maritime security cooperation with Quad countries. All of which are wins for China.

The existing relationship between Muizzu and Wang will no doubt make it easier for China moving forward. Wang is a seasoned diplomat with previous postings to India, Singapore, and Nepal. She has also held senior roles in the Department of Asian Affairs and Department of External Security Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs26. Wang’s past experience will help her advocate for Chinese interests whilst at the same time navigating the complexities of Maldivian politics.

Muizzu has also previously spoken highly of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and suggested that it has been a net benefit for the country27. Therefore, it is also likely that more BRI projects will be announced in the near future, which Wang suggested would likely be “in the fields of health, environmental protection, blue economy as well as agriculture and fishery”28.

In a further sign of Muizzu’s close friendship with China, on 9 Oct he was invited to attend a reception hosted by the Chinese embassy celebrating the 74^th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Interestingly, current President Solih was not present. During Muizzu’s remarks, he reiterated his wish for further development of China-Maldives relations29.

Whilst early indications show that Muizzu is also seeking to have a positive relationship with India and will likely make his first overseas trip there30, it is expected that following his inauguration, Muizzu’s government will seek to bring China-Maldives relations to heights not seen since President Yameen’s years in office.

References

In addition to criticism from individual countries, Gabon’s membership of the Commonwealth, African Union, and Economic Community of Central African States was also partially or fully suspended. In late September, the US also announced that they were pausing certain forms of foreign assistance to Gabon.

Instead of following a similar path, China has chosen to fully engage with Gabon’s new regime. In line with China’s policy of non-interference in internal affairs, China simply called for a peaceful resolution through dialogue, a return to regular order, and for the personal safety of President Bongo. No demand was made for the restoration of Bongo’s government.

Cornelia Tremann, writing for the Interpreter, explained that China tends to prioritise diplomatic stability and suggested that Chinese officials would seek to have a positive relationship with whomever ended up governing Gabon. Tremann also argued that the coup presented an opportunity for China to further promote its interests in light of France’s waning influence.

Evidence suggests that China is already working proactively in Gabon. In recent weeks, Ambassador Li Jinjin has held multiple meetings with members of the transitional government, including (listed by date of meeting):

• Minister of the Economy, Mays Mouissi (20/09/23)

• Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, Jonathan Ignoumba (20/09/23)

• President of the Senate, Paulette Missambo (22/09/23)

• Speaker of the National Assembly, Jean-François Ndongou (28/09/23)

• Minister of Water and Forestry, Colonel Maurice Ntossui (28/09/23)

• Prime Minister, Raymond Ndong Sima (02/10/23)

• President, Brice Oligui Nguema (03/10/23)

• Minister for Foreign Affairs, Régis Onanga Ndiaye (05/10/23)

The topic of discussion at these meetings centred primarily on bilateral cooperation with respect to each minister’s portfolio, Chinese business interests and investment, as well as China and Gabon’s comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership, which was established earlier in 2023.

China’s proactivity appears to have already paid off. During Ambassador Li Jinjin’s speech at a reception hosted in Libreville celebrating the 74th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, he confirmed that “the transitional authorities are committed to respecting all bilateral and multilateral agreements and expressed their desire to continue to develop state-to-state relations with friendly countries''.

In other words, China’s relationship with Gabon is stable and prospects are good. A quick look at the guest list of the 74th anniversary reception also showed that at least 10 senior members of Gabon’s transitional government were in attendance.

Whilst not publicly confirmed, there is another possible reason why China has been so proactive recently. According to Paul Deutschmann at Africa Intelligence, an agreement for the establishment of a Chinese naval base in Gabon had been put “effectively on ice” following the coup. The deal, which had not been made public, was reportedly negotiated earlier this year between China and ex-President Bongo’s government. If this agreement did indeed take place, has Li Jinjin managed to salvage it?

In summary, China has spent the past few weeks establishing positive relationships with Gabon’s new transitional government. Whilst diplomatic contact has occurred between Gabon and some European powers, such as France and Switzerland, none of them have thus far publicly embraced the new Gabonese regime in the same way as China.

That being said, it was France that sent its ambassador to meet with General Nguema immediately following the coup. According to reports, the General did express a desire for closer relations with France during the meeting.

For now, however, closer ties with France will be difficult for Nguema’s government to achieve. This is because the French government have publicly condemned the coup and called for the election results to be respected. It will take time before the French will be able to change their stance without appearing to tacitly accept Gabon’s coup d'état. Nevertheless, China may still find that France is not willing to cede its influence in Gabon without a fight. But for now, it is China that is on the front foot.

Whilst the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that Zhao’s appointment was part of a normal rotation of ambassadorial appointments, a Reuters article pointed out that the decision to present credentials sets China apart. This is because other countries have opted to use of the title ‘charge d'affaires’, which does not require the formal presentation of credentials2.

This has led many to speculate that official recognition from China might be imminent, which would make China the first country to officially recognise the Taliban-led government. The Taliban has struggled to gain international recognition, mostly due to the group’s extremist views, association with terrorist groups, and poor human rights record.

Before discussing Zhao’s selection in more detail, it is important to first consider the current state of China – Afghanistan relations.

After the Taliban’s return to power, China was quick to indicate a willingness to continue engagement with the country, particularly on issues such as security and trade. According to a SIPRI report published in November 2022, China’s biggest priority in Afghanistan is security, namely, the safety of Chinese citizens, the protection of investments, as well as the suppression of extremist groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which uses Afghanistan as a safe haven3. Without the Taliban’s cooperation, it will be difficult for China to address any of these issues.

China has also signalled a desire to strengthen economic ties with Afghanistan. Following the 5th China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Dialogue, held in May 2023, a joint statement was published that reaffirmed “trilateral cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and to jointly extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor [CPEC] to Afghanistan”4. The potential extension of CPEC into Afghanistan has been an on-going discussion since at least 20175, however progress has been slow.

Afghanistan’s natural resources have long attracted the attention of Chinese investors. The most significant development since the Taliban’s return happened in early 2023, when the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC) reached an agreement that Aljazeera called “the first major public commodities extraction deal the Taliban administration has signed with a foreign company since taking power in 2021”. The deal will involve the investment worth hundreds of millions of dollars into Afghanistan6.

Zabihullah Mujahid, a spokesman for the Taliban-led government, stated during an interview in 2022 that “[t]he Taliban wants China’s help. Their investments are important for [the Taliban] too. Afghanistan is a very good market. China can use its influence at the United Nations to help Afghanistan and its investors to solve their problems”7. It appears as if China was listening, because at a Security Council meeting less than 6 months later, China called for the lifting of sanctions on Afghanistan and the return of the Afghan Central Bank’s assets held overseas8. The Taliban is clearly optimistic that relations with China will help it gain a footing in the international community.

It is within this context that Zhao Xing begins his term as China’s Ambassador to Afghanistan. Whilst a detailed CV of Zhao’s diplomatic career is not available, China Diplomatic Digest was able to approximate Zhao’s background using online sources.

For the past 10 years, Zhao has spent the majority of his time at the MFA’s Department of International Organizations and Conferences. According to the MFA’s website, the Department

“[s]tudies the developments and trends in multilateral diplomacy, deals with multilateral diplomatic affairs in political, human rights, social, refugee and other fields and gives guidance to China's overseas diplomatic missions on the relevant work”9. 

During his time in the department, Zhao has dealt with diplomatic issues relating to global covid vaccine distribution10, development funding11, and migration12. In late 2022, Zhao also gave a speech about multilateralism with Chinese characteristics13.

Since arriving in Afghanistan, Zhao has already met with senior Taliban leader and Acting Minister of Interior, Sirajuddin Haqqani14, as well as the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan, Roza Otunbayeva15.

It is therefore fair to infer that Zhao is in Afghanistan to assist the Taliban with issues relating to international engagement. Whilst the specifics of Zhao’s priorities are yet to be revealed, it is likely that he will play an important role moving forward. The Taliban will, no doubt, appreciate having an expert in multilateralism as China’s envoy.

Zhao Xing CV

2013 - ?  Director, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, MFA16

2016 – 201817 18 Counselor, Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other international organizations

201919 Counselor, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, MFA

202020 Second-class Inspector, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, MFA

2021 - 202321 22 Deputy Director-General, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, MFA

202323 – Present Ambassador to Afghanistan

References